Files
claude-code/docs/features/acp-link.md
Dosion c2ac9a74c1 fix: resolve dependency audit findings precisely (#361)
* fix: harden ACP communication boundaries

Harden ACP communication boundaries

Remote ACP sessions now cannot widen permission mode through untrusted
metadata or client payloads. WebSocket ACP ingress measures payloads by bytes
before binary decode, and prompt queue handoff keeps exactly one prompt active
while queued prompts are drained FIFO.

Constraint: ACP remote clients must not be able to open bypassPermissions without local launch intent
Constraint: WebSocket payload limits must be byte-based and checked before binary decode
Rejected: Keep promptToQueryContent wrapper | no production consumers remained after prompt conversion single-sourcing
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Do not re-enable remote bypassPermissions from _meta unless a local launch gate is verified in both acp-link and agent
Tested: targeted ACP/RCS/acp-link prompt queue, bridge, permission, payload, and prompt conversion tests; bun run typecheck; bun run build
Not-tested: Manual live ACP/RCS session against an external client

* fix: restore repository verification gates

Keep the full repository test, typecheck, build, and Biome lint gates usable
after the ACP fix pass. This commit is intentionally separate from the ACP
behavior change: it fixes Windows-safe Langfuse home redaction, removes stale
lint suppressions, resolves Biome warning/info diagnostics, and keeps env
expansion tests explicit without template-placeholder lint noise.

Constraint: The project completion contract requires full typecheck, lint, test, and build evidence
Rejected: Leave warning/info diagnostics as historical noise | they obscure future gate regressions and weaken flow-impact claims
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep repository gate cleanup separate from feature fixes when it is not part of the same runtime path
Tested: bunx biome lint src/; bunx tsc --noEmit; bun test src/services/mcp/__tests__/envExpansion.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/sliceAnsi.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/stringUtils.test.ts; bun test; bun run build
Not-tested: Manual Langfuse export against a real external Langfuse service

* fix: harden ACP failure boundaries after review

Deep review found several paths that made ACP communication failures look normal: prompt errors could finish as end_turn, permission pipeline exceptions could fall through to client approval, tool rawInput was deep-copied with JSON, and acp-link accepted unbounded or unvalidated WebSocket payloads. This keeps the behavior fail-closed, validates WS payloads before dispatch, caps payload size before JSON parse, and preserves cancellation intent with a generation counter.

Constraint: User explicitly rejected pseudo-fixes, fallback behavior, and unbounded payload handling

Rejected: Keep JSON stringify/parse rawInput copy | duplicates large payloads and silently drops non-JSON inputs

Rejected: Delegate permission pipeline errors to client approval | allows a broken local permission check to be bypassed

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Directive: Do not convert ACP errors into normal end_turn responses without a protocol-level reason and regression tests

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts

Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit

Tested: bunx biome lint src/ packages/acp-link/src/

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: bun run build

Not-tested: Manual end-to-end ACP client session over a real editor WebSocket

* fix: prevent ACP coverage runs from seeing partial mocks

GitHub Actions failed under bun test --coverage because permissions.test.ts replaced ../bridge.js with a partial mock that omitted forwardSessionUpdates. Coverage worker ordering on Linux let sibling tests observe that incomplete module.

This isolates ACP test mocks by snapshotting real exports, overriding only requested symbols, and restoring mocks in LIFO order. The shared helper also keeps the same behavior in agent.test.ts without duplicating mock infrastructure.

Constraint: bun:test mock.module is process-global inside a worker.

Rejected: Add fallback exports or production guards | the bridge export exists; the failure was test mock pollution.

Rejected: Keep per-file helper copies | duplication would let restore semantics drift again.

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Prefer safeMockModule for partial mocks of real modules in ACP tests; plain mock.module is only appropriate for fully synthetic modules or isolated tests.

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts

Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: git diff --check

Not-tested: Linux runner directly before push

* fix: normalize ACP bypass requests without warning noise

The previous CI repair removed the failing partial bridge mock, but it also added a shared safeMockModule helper and left the acp-link bypass normalization warning in the real new_session path.

This tightens the fix: acp-link now treats an unauthorized client bypass request as normal permission-mode normalization without emitting a warning, and the ACP permission test explicitly preserves the real bridge and permission exports instead of using a shared helper. The agent test keeps its local mock preservation but names it by behavior and restores mocks in LIFO order.

Constraint: CI output should not contain expected warning noise for covered policy branches.

Rejected: Silence the test only | the normal new_session path would still warn for an expected normalization branch.

Rejected: Keep the shared safeMockModule helper | the failing module was specific and should be fixed by preserving real exports at the mocking site.

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Treat client-requested bypassPermissions as data to normalize unless the local default explicitly enables bypass.

Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts

Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov with UPPER_WARN_COUNT=0

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit

Tested: git diff --check

* fix: harden ACP bypass and CI warning gates

ACP clients must not be able to enter bypassPermissions unless the local ACP gate and process environment both allow it. The same gate now controls session creation, explicit mode changes, and the ExitPlanMode option list, while session setup restores process.cwd so coverage and later work do not inherit ACP session state.

Constraint: CI must stay warning-clean without hiding real ACP permission failures

Rejected: Logging rejected bypass requests on the normal new_session path | it preserves audit text but reintroduces warning noise the runtime should not emit

Rejected: Broad CI=true postinstall skip | it hides explicit Chrome MCP setup checks outside the install path

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Directive: Keep bypassPermissions gated through one ACP availability decision before exposing it to clients

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: bun run build:vite with zero warning matches

Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter lcov --coverage-dir coverage produced non-empty lcov with SF records and zero filtered warning matches

Not-tested: GitHub Actions result after this push

* fix: remove remaining CI warning noise

The CI log still had three non-failing warnings after the ACP hardening commit: git init default-branch advice from checkout, a Node 20 action-runtime deprecation, and one additional known Vite dynamic-import diagnostic that only surfaced on Linux. The workflow now provides explicit git config and opts actions into Node 24, while Vite keeps a narrow allowlist for acknowledged optimizer diagnostics.

Constraint: Do not use shell log filtering to hide warnings after they happen

Rejected: Grep warning lines out of CI output | it would make future diagnostics harder to find

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Add new Vite warning allowlist entries only after checking that they are existing optimizer diagnostics, not new application defects

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false

Tested: bunx biome lint .github/workflows/ci.yml vite.config.ts

Tested: bun run build:vite with zero warning matches

Not-tested: GitHub Actions result after this push

* fix: reject unauthorized ACP bypass and harden CI actions

ACP clients now fail closed when permissionMode is malformed, unknown, or requests bypass without a local bypass opt-in. acp-link validates new_session input before forwarding to the agent and returns client error frames for expected unauthorized requests without logging create-failed noise. The direct AcpAgent path independently rejects invalid _meta.permissionMode and unauthorized bypass instead of falling back to settings.

CI workflows and generated GitHub App templates now use Node 24-compatible actions pinned to immutable commit SHAs, and acp-link startup output no longer prints the auth token.

Constraint: Must not hide warnings with test isolation or log filtering

Rejected: Silent fallback to local permission mode | accepts invalid client intent and masks boundary behavior

Rejected: Broad dependency churn from bun update | audit remained failing while package and lockfile churn expanded scope

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Directive: Client-provided permissionMode must stay fail-closed before reaching AcpAgent; only local settings.defaultMode may fall back to default on invalid local config

Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts src/services/skillLearning/__tests__/skillLifecycle.test.ts src/utils/settings/__tests__/config.test.ts

Tested: bunx tsc -p packages/acp-link/tsconfig.json --noEmit --pretty false

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: local CI equivalent install/typecheck/coverage/build with warning_scan=0

Not-tested: Pre-existing bun audit vulnerabilities require a separate dependency-hardening PR

* fix: resolve dependency audit findings precisely

Use dependency-native upgrades and lockfile resolution to close the audit findings without suppressions. Keep the chrome MCP setup aligned with the new dependency graph and add real integration coverage so the override behavior stays verified.

Constraint: no audit ignores or warning suppression
Rejected: broad google-auth/protobuf overrides | replaced with upstream-compatible resolution
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: keep dependency fixes upstream-compatible; do not reintroduce blanket overrides unless the audit surface changes materially
Tested: bun audit; bun audit --json; bun install --frozen-lockfile with CLAUDE_CODE_SKIP_CHROME_MCP_SETUP=1; bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false; bun run lint; targeted tests; bun run test:all; bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter lcov --coverage-dir coverage; bun run build:vite
Not-tested: unrelated pre-existing ACP/CORS/token fallback residual risks

* fix: keep ACP auth tokens out of URLs

Replace the ad hoc URL-token flow with crypto UUID-backed transport identifiers so the bearer token stays in structured request data instead of query strings. Keep the server, web client, and transport helpers aligned so the ACP/RCS handshake remains compatible after the API shape change.

Constraint: token must not be embedded in the URL
Rejected: token-as-uuid query fallback | leaked bearer tokens in URLs
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: preserve the structured auth path; do not reintroduce query-token fallback when adjusting ACP transport code
Tested: targeted ACP/RCS transport tests
Not-tested: unrelated pre-existing ACP/CORS/token fallback residual risks

* fix: normalize WebFetch request headers

Normalize WebFetch headers before dispatch so canonicalization preserves auth semantics and duplicate forms do not slip through. Keep the behavior locked with a focused header test instead of broadening the request pipeline.

Constraint: preserve header semantics without widening the fetch surface
Rejected: ad hoc caller-side normalization | too easy to bypass in future call sites
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: keep header normalization close to the WebFetch utility so future callers inherit the same behavior automatically
Tested: targeted WebFetch header tests
Not-tested: unrelated fetch backend behavior beyond header normalization

* fix: harden ACP remote auth surfaces

Tighten the remaining Claude security artifact items by requiring API keys on ACP global reads and relay upgrades, moving WebSocket tokens out of URLs, and replacing open web CORS with an explicit allowlist.

Constraint: Browser WebSocket clients cannot set arbitrary Authorization headers, so the token is carried in a selected subprotocol instead of a query string.
Rejected: Keep UUID auth for ACP channel groups | any caller can mint a UUID and read global ACP data.
Rejected: Preserve ?token= compatibility | secrets leak into logs, history, referrers, and intermediaries.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Do not reintroduce query-string bearer tokens; use Authorization or rcs.auth.<base64url-token>.
Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false
Tested: bun run typecheck in packages/remote-control-server
Tested: bun run build in packages/acp-link
Tested: bun run lint
Tested: bun audit
Tested: focused RCS/acp-link/web tests, 160 pass
Tested: Edge headless browser WebSocket subprotocol handshake
Tested: bun run test:all, 3669 pass
Tested: bun run build:vite
Tested: bun run build
Not-tested: Manual end-to-end relay with a live external ACP agent

* fix: resolve CI dependency override lookup

The CI runner does not expose @grpc/proto-loader as a root-resolvable package, and the test was relying on local hoisting rather than the real dependency owner. Resolve proto-loader through @opentelemetry/exporter-trace-otlp-grpc and @grpc/grpc-js so the smoke test follows the package graph it is validating.

Constraint: Do not add a new root dependency for a transitive smoke test.

Rejected: Skip or weaken the test | the test protects the protobuf 7 override path and should keep exercising loadSync.

Rejected: Add @grpc/proto-loader directly to root package.json | that hides the owning-package resolution issue and broadens dependency surface.

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Dependency override smoke tests should resolve from the package that actually owns the dependency, not from incidental root hoisting.

Tested: bun test tests/integration/dependency-overrides.test.ts; bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false; bun run lint; bun audit; bun run test:all; git diff --check

---------

Co-authored-by: unraid <local@unraid.local>
2026-04-26 19:49:54 +08:00

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# acp-link — ACP 代理服务器
> 源码目录:`packages/acp-link/`
> PR: #292
> 新增时间2026-04-18
## 一、功能概述
`acp-link` 是一个 ACP (Agent Client Protocol) 代理服务器,将 WebSocket 客户端桥接到 ACP agent 的 stdio 接口。它让 ACP agent如 Claude Code可以通过 WebSocket 远程访问,而不仅限于本地 stdio。
### 核心特性
- **WebSocket → stdio 桥接**:将浏览器/远程客户端的 WebSocket 连接转换为 ACP agent 的 stdin/stdout NDJSON 流
- **会话管理**:创建、加载、恢复、列出、关闭会话
- **权限审批流程**:客户端可远程审批 agent 的工具权限请求
- **RCS 集成**:可与 Remote Control Server (RCS) 连接,将 ACP agent 注册到 RCS 并通过 Web UI 交互
- **HTTPS 支持**:内置自签名证书生成,支持安全连接
- **Token 认证**:自动生成或通过环境变量配置认证 token
## 二、架构
### 独立模式
```
┌──────────────────┐ WebSocket ┌──────────────────┐ stdio/NDJSON ┌──────────────┐
│ 浏览器/客户端 │ ◄──────────────►│ acp-link │ ◄────────────────►│ ACP Agent │
│ (WS Client) │ ws://host:port │ (Proxy Server) │ spawn subprocess │ (Claude等) │
└──────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ └──────────────┘
```
### RCS 集成模式
```
┌──────────────┐ WebSocket ┌──────────────────┐ stdio/NDJSON ┌──────────────┐
│ RCS Web UI │ ◄──────────────►│ Remote Control │ ◄─────────────────►│ acp-link │
│ (/code/*) │ ACP Relay WS │ Server (RCS) │ ACP events │ + Agent │
└──────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ └──────────────┘
```
### 文件结构
```
packages/acp-link/
├── src/
│ ├── server.ts # 主服务器WS 连接管理、会话管理、权限处理、消息桥接
│ ├── rcs-upstream.ts # RCS 上游客户端REST 注册 + WS identify 两步流程
│ ├── cert.ts # TLS 证书生成(自签名)
│ ├── logger.ts # 日志模块
│ ├── types.ts # JSON-RPC 和 ACP 协议类型定义
│ ├── cli/
│ │ ├── bin.ts # CLI 入口
│ │ ├── command.ts # 命令行参数解析
│ │ ├── app.ts # 应用启动
│ │ └── context.ts # 上下文配置
│ └── __tests__/ # 测试cert, server, types
├── package.json
└── tsconfig.json
```
## 三、安装与使用
### 基本用法
```bash
# 直接运行(在 monorepo 中)
# 注意claude 本身不支持 ACP需要用 ccb-bun --acp 启动 ACP agent
bun packages/acp-link/src/cli/bin.ts ccb-bun -- --acp
# 指定端口和主机
acp-link --port 9000 --host 0.0.0.0 ccb-bun -- --acp
# 启用 HTTPS自签名证书
acp-link --https ccb-bun -- --acp
# 调试模式
acp-link --debug ccb-bun -- --acp
```
### CLI 参考
```
USAGE
acp-link [--port value] [--host value] [--debug] [--no-auth] [--https] <command>...
acp-link --help
acp-link --version
FLAGS
[--port] Port to listen on [default = 9315]
[--host] Host to bind to [default = localhost]
[--debug] Enable debug logging to file
[--no-auth] Disable authentication (dangerous)
[--https] Enable HTTPS with self-signed cert
-h --help Print help information and exit
-v --version Print version information and exit
ARGUMENTS
command... Agent command followed by its arguments (e.g. "ccb-bun -- --acp")
```
## 四、认证
默认启动时自动生成随机 token。客户端连接时不要把 token 放在 URL 中:
```
ws://localhost:9315/ws
```
无法发送 `Authorization` header 的 WebSocket 客户端需要使用
`rcs.auth.<base64url-token>` 子协议传递 token。
配置固定 token
```bash
ACP_AUTH_TOKEN=my-fixed-token acp-link ccb-bun -- --acp
```
禁用认证(不推荐,仅用于开发):
```bash
acp-link --no-auth ccb-bun -- --acp
```
## 五、RCS 集成
acp-link 支持将 ACP agent 注册到 Remote Control Server通过 Web UI 远程操控。
### 连接方式
```bash
# 通过环境变量配置 RCS 连接
ACP_RCS_URL=http://localhost:3000 \
ACP_RCS_TOKEN=sk-rcs-your-key \
acp-link ccb-bun -- --acp
```
### 注册流程(两步)
1. **REST 注册**:通过 `POST /v1/environments/bridge` 向 RCS 注册环境
2. **WS identify**:建立 WebSocket 连接后发送 `identify` 消息(携带 agentId替代完整 `register`
RCS 的 ACP WebSocket 连接不接受 URL query token。acp-link 会通过
`rcs.auth.<base64url-token>` WebSocket 子协议发送 `ACP_RCS_TOKEN`
```
acp-link RCS
│ │
│── POST /v1/environments/bridge ──►│ (REST 注册)
│◄── { agentId, sessionId } ───────│
│ │
│── WS connect ─────────────────►│ (WebSocket)
│── identify { agentId } ────────►│ (WS 标识)
│◄── identified ─────────────────│
│ │
│── ACP events ─────────────────►│ (双向消息转发)
│◄── user prompts/permissions ───│
```
## 六、权限模式
### permissionMode 传递链
权限模式通过整条链路传递Web UI → RCS → acp-link → ACP agent。
支持的权限模式:
- `default` — 每次请求权限确认
- `auto` — 自动判断
- `acceptEdits` — 自动接受编辑
- `plan` — 规划模式
- `dontAsk` — 不询问
- `bypassPermissions` — 绕过权限(需 sandbox 环境)
### fallback 链
当客户端未显式传递 permissionMode 时,使用以下 fallback 链:
```
客户端传值 > config.permissionMode > ACP_PERMISSION_MODE 环境变量
```
示例:
```bash
ACP_PERMISSION_MODE=auto acp-link ccb-bun -- --acp
```
## 七、权限管道2026-04-18 改进)
### 模式同步
`applySessionMode` 在 agent 切换权限模式时同步 `appState.toolPermissionContext.mode`,确保内部权限上下文与 ACP 客户端状态一致。
### 统一权限流水线
`createAcpCanUseTool` 接入 `hasPermissionsToUseTool` 统一权限流水线,替代原来分散的处理逻辑。支持 `onModeChange` 回调,模式变更时实时同步。
### bypass 检测
`bypassPermissions` 模式增加可用性检测 — 仅在非 root 或 sandbox 环境中允许启用,防止权限绕过的安全风险。
## 八、环境变量
| 变量 | 说明 |
|------|------|
| `ACP_AUTH_TOKEN` | 固定认证 token默认自动生成 |
| `ACP_PERMISSION_MODE` | 默认权限模式 fallback |
| `ACP_RCS_URL` | RCS 服务器地址(启用 RCS 集成) |
| `ACP_RCS_TOKEN` | RCS API token |