mirror of
https://github.com/claude-code-best/claude-code.git
synced 2026-06-20 07:15:51 +00:00
feat(acp): bypassPermissions 默认显示,去掉 opt-in 限制
之前 bypassPermissions 需要本地显式 opt-in(ACP_PERMISSION_MODE 环境变量、 CLAUDE_CODE_ACP_ALLOW_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS 环境变量、或 settings.permissions.defaultMode) 才会出现在 modes 列表里 —— 标准客户端看不到这个 mode,永远没法切换。 去掉 opt-in 后,只要进程级允许(非 root 或 IS_SANDBOX=1)就显示。 - permissionMode: isAcpBypassPermissionModeAvailable 只保留进程级检查,删除 isAcpBypassLocallyEnabled / isSettingsBypassPermissionMode / isTruthyEnv 等 只服务于 opt-in 的辅助函数 - createSessionMethod: 调用方去掉 settingsMode 参数 - agent.test: 反转所有依赖 "bypass 需要 opt-in" 的断言 Co-Authored-By: glm-5.2 <zai-org@claude-code-best.win>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -411,29 +411,23 @@ describe('AcpAgent', () => {
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expect(res.modes?.currentModeId).toBe('plan')
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})
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test('rejects _meta.permissionMode bypass without a local ACP bypass gate', async () => {
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mockGetSettings.mockImplementationOnce(() => ({
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permissions: { defaultMode: 'acceptEdits' },
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}))
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const consoleErrorSpy = spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(
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() => {},
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)
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test('honors _meta.permissionMode bypass without any opt-in (always available when process allows)', async () => {
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// bypass is exposed by default; only the root/sandbox process guard remains.
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const agent = new AcpAgent(makeConn())
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try {
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await expect(
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agent.newSession({
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cwd: '/tmp',
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_meta: { permissionMode: 'bypassPermissions' },
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} as any),
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).rejects.toThrow('Mode not available: bypassPermissions')
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const res = await agent.newSession({
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cwd: '/tmp',
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_meta: { permissionMode: 'bypassPermissions' },
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} as any)
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expect(consoleErrorSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
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} finally {
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consoleErrorSpy.mockRestore()
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}
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expect(res.modes?.currentModeId).toBe('bypassPermissions')
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expect(res.modes?.availableModes.map((mode: any) => mode.id)).toContain(
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'bypassPermissions',
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)
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})
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test('honors _meta.permissionMode bypass with a local ACP bypass gate', async () => {
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test('honors _meta.permissionMode bypass regardless of local env gate', async () => {
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// The old CLAUDE_CODE_ACP_ALLOW_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS opt-in no longer gates availability,
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// but setting it should still not break the request.
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process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_ACP_ALLOW_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS = '1'
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const agent = new AcpAgent(makeConn())
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const res = await agent.newSession({
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@@ -987,28 +981,15 @@ describe('AcpAgent', () => {
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).rejects.toThrow('Session not found')
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})
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test('availableModes excludes bypassPermissions without a local ACP bypass gate', async () => {
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test('availableModes includes bypassPermissions by default (no opt-in needed)', async () => {
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const agent = new AcpAgent(makeConn())
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const { sessionId } = await agent.newSession({ cwd: '/tmp' } as any)
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const session = agent.sessions.get(sessionId)
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const modeIds = session?.modes.availableModes.map((m: any) => m.id)
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expect(modeIds).not.toContain('bypassPermissions')
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expect(modeIds).toContain('bypassPermissions')
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})
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test('rejects bypassPermissions without a local ACP bypass gate', async () => {
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const agent = new AcpAgent(makeConn())
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const { sessionId } = await agent.newSession({ cwd: '/tmp' } as any)
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await expect(
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agent.setSessionMode({ sessionId, modeId: 'bypassPermissions' } as any),
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).rejects.toThrow('Mode not available')
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const session = agent.sessions.get(sessionId)
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expect(session?.modes.currentModeId).toBe('default')
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expect(session?.appState.toolPermissionContext.mode).toBe('default')
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})
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test('can switch to bypassPermissions mode with a local ACP bypass gate', async () => {
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process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_ACP_ALLOW_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS = '1'
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test('can switch to bypassPermissions without any opt-in gate', async () => {
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const agent = new AcpAgent(makeConn())
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const { sessionId } = await agent.newSession({ cwd: '/tmp' } as any)
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await agent.setSessionMode({
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@@ -1023,7 +1004,8 @@ describe('AcpAgent', () => {
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})
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test('rejects bypassPermissions when the session does not expose it', async () => {
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process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_ACP_ALLOW_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS = '1'
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// Even though bypass is available by default, removeBypassMode simulates a session
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// where the mode was stripped (e.g., future custom filter). The rejection still fires.
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const agent = new AcpAgent(makeConn())
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const { sessionId } = await agent.newSession({ cwd: '/tmp' } as any)
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const session = agent.sessions.get(sessionId)
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@@ -1069,15 +1051,17 @@ describe('AcpAgent', () => {
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const session = agent.sessions.get(sessionId)
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removeBypassMode(session)
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// The value is rejected because it is not in the option's listed values
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// (config-option validation runs before the mode-availability check).
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// bypassPermissions passes the config-option layer (it's still listed in the
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// option's options array — removeBypassMode only strips it from modes.availableModes
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// and isBypassPermissionsModeAvailable), then applySessionMode rejects it with
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// "Mode not available". This covers the second of the two validation layers.
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await expect(
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agent.setSessionConfigOption({
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sessionId,
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configId: 'mode',
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value: 'bypassPermissions',
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} as any),
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).rejects.toThrow(/Invalid value 'bypassPermissions'/)
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).rejects.toThrow('Mode not available')
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expect(session?.modes.currentModeId).toBe('default')
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expect(session?.appState.toolPermissionContext.mode).toBe('default')
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@@ -137,10 +137,10 @@ async function createSession(
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// Parse MCP servers from ACP params
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// MCP server config is handled separately in the tools system
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// ACP clients can expose bypass only when both the process and local config allow it.
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const isBypassAvailable = isAcpBypassPermissionModeAvailable(
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settingsPermissionMode,
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)
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// bypassPermissions is exposed to ACP clients whenever the process itself allows it
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// (non-root or sandbox). The previous additional opt-in gate made the mode invisible
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// to standard clients and defeated the purpose of listing it. See permissionMode.ts.
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const isBypassAvailable = isAcpBypassPermissionModeAvailable()
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// Create a mutable AppState for the session
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const appState: AppState = {
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@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ export function resolveSessionPermissionMode(
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)
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if (
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metaResolved === 'bypassPermissions' &&
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!isAcpBypassPermissionModeAvailable(settingsMode)
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!isAcpBypassPermissionModeAvailable()
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) {
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throw new Error(
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'Mode not available: bypassPermissions requires a local ACP bypass opt-in.',
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'Mode not available: bypassPermissions cannot run as root (start the agent as a non-root user, or set IS_SANDBOX=1).',
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)
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}
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@@ -78,14 +78,20 @@ export function hasOwnField(
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return !!value && Object.hasOwn(value, key)
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}
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export function isAcpBypassPermissionModeAvailable(
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settingsMode?: unknown,
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): boolean {
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return (
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isProcessBypassPermissionModeAvailable() &&
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(isAcpBypassLocallyEnabled() ||
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isSettingsBypassPermissionMode(settingsMode))
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)
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/**
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* Whether bypassPermissions is selectable by ACP clients.
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*
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* The previous implementation required a local opt-in (ACP_PERMISSION_MODE env var,
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* CLAUDE_CODE_ACP_ALLOW_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS env var, or settings.permissions.defaultMode).
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* That gate made the mode invisible to standard clients unless the operator already
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* pre-configured it — defeating the point of exposing it through the ACP mode list.
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*
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* The only remaining guard is the process-level one: bypass must not silently run
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* as root (where every skipped permission check is a privilege boundary crossed),
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* unless explicitly marked as a sandbox.
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*/
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export function isAcpBypassPermissionModeAvailable(): boolean {
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return isProcessBypassPermissionModeAvailable()
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}
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function isProcessBypassPermissionModeAvailable(): boolean {
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@@ -94,22 +100,3 @@ function isProcessBypassPermissionModeAvailable(): boolean {
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if (typeof process.getuid === 'function') return process.getuid() !== 0
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return true
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}
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function isAcpBypassLocallyEnabled(): boolean {
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return (
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process.env.ACP_PERMISSION_MODE === 'bypassPermissions' ||
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isTruthyEnv(process.env.CLAUDE_CODE_ACP_ALLOW_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS)
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)
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}
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function isSettingsBypassPermissionMode(settingsMode: unknown): boolean {
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try {
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return resolvePermissionMode(settingsMode) === 'bypassPermissions'
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} catch {
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return false
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}
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}
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function isTruthyEnv(value: string | undefined): boolean {
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return value === '1' || value?.toLowerCase() === 'true'
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}
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