Files
claude-code/src/bridge/webhookSanitizer.ts
2026-05-01 21:39:30 +08:00

81 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Sanitize inbound GitHub webhook payload content before it enters the session.
*
* Called from useReplBridge.tsx when feature('KAIROS_GITHUB_WEBHOOKS') is enabled.
* Strips known secret patterns (tokens, API keys, credentials) while preserving
* the meaningful content (PR titles, descriptions, commit messages, etc.).
*
* Must be synchronous and never throw — on error, returns a safe placeholder.
*/
/** Patterns that match known secret/token formats. */
const SECRET_PATTERNS: Array<{ pattern: RegExp; replacement: string }> = [
// GitHub tokens (PAT, OAuth, App, Server-to-server)
{
pattern: /\b(ghp|gho|ghs|ghu|github_pat)_[A-Za-z0-9_]{10,}\b/g,
replacement: '[REDACTED_GITHUB_TOKEN]',
},
// Anthropic API keys
{
pattern: /\bsk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\b/g,
replacement: '[REDACTED_ANTHROPIC_KEY]',
},
// Generic Bearer tokens in headers
{
pattern: /(Bearer\s+)[A-Za-z0-9._\-/+=]{20,}/gi,
replacement: '$1[REDACTED_TOKEN]',
},
// AWS access keys
{
pattern: /\b(AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}\b/g,
replacement: '[REDACTED_AWS_KEY]',
},
// AWS secret keys (40-char base64-like strings after common labels)
{
pattern:
/(aws_secret_access_key|secret_key|SecretAccessKey)['":\s=]+[A-Za-z0-9/+=]{30,}/gi,
replacement: '$1=[REDACTED_AWS_SECRET]',
},
// Generic API key patterns (key=value or "key": "value")
{
pattern:
/(api[_-]?key|apikey|secret|password|token|credential)['":\s=]+["']?[A-Za-z0-9._\-/+=]{16,}["']?/gi,
replacement: '$1=[REDACTED]',
},
// npm tokens
{ pattern: /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/g, replacement: '[REDACTED_NPM_TOKEN]' },
// Slack tokens
{
pattern: /\bxox[bporas]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b/g,
replacement: '[REDACTED_SLACK_TOKEN]',
},
]
/** Maximum content length before truncation (100KB). */
const MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH = 100_000
export function sanitizeInboundWebhookContent(content: string): string {
try {
if (!content) return content
let sanitized = content
// Redact known secret patterns first (before truncation to avoid
// splitting a secret across the truncation boundary)
for (const { pattern, replacement } of SECRET_PATTERNS) {
pattern.lastIndex = 0
sanitized = sanitized.replace(pattern, replacement)
}
// Truncate excessively large payloads after redaction
if (sanitized.length > MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH) {
sanitized = sanitized.slice(0, MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH) + '\n... [truncated]'
}
return sanitized
} catch {
// Never throw, never return raw content — return a safe placeholder
return '[webhook content redacted due to sanitization error]'
}
}