Files
claude-code/packages/acp-link/src/server.ts
Dosion c2ac9a74c1 fix: resolve dependency audit findings precisely (#361)
* fix: harden ACP communication boundaries

Harden ACP communication boundaries

Remote ACP sessions now cannot widen permission mode through untrusted
metadata or client payloads. WebSocket ACP ingress measures payloads by bytes
before binary decode, and prompt queue handoff keeps exactly one prompt active
while queued prompts are drained FIFO.

Constraint: ACP remote clients must not be able to open bypassPermissions without local launch intent
Constraint: WebSocket payload limits must be byte-based and checked before binary decode
Rejected: Keep promptToQueryContent wrapper | no production consumers remained after prompt conversion single-sourcing
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Do not re-enable remote bypassPermissions from _meta unless a local launch gate is verified in both acp-link and agent
Tested: targeted ACP/RCS/acp-link prompt queue, bridge, permission, payload, and prompt conversion tests; bun run typecheck; bun run build
Not-tested: Manual live ACP/RCS session against an external client

* fix: restore repository verification gates

Keep the full repository test, typecheck, build, and Biome lint gates usable
after the ACP fix pass. This commit is intentionally separate from the ACP
behavior change: it fixes Windows-safe Langfuse home redaction, removes stale
lint suppressions, resolves Biome warning/info diagnostics, and keeps env
expansion tests explicit without template-placeholder lint noise.

Constraint: The project completion contract requires full typecheck, lint, test, and build evidence
Rejected: Leave warning/info diagnostics as historical noise | they obscure future gate regressions and weaken flow-impact claims
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep repository gate cleanup separate from feature fixes when it is not part of the same runtime path
Tested: bunx biome lint src/; bunx tsc --noEmit; bun test src/services/mcp/__tests__/envExpansion.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/sliceAnsi.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/stringUtils.test.ts; bun test; bun run build
Not-tested: Manual Langfuse export against a real external Langfuse service

* fix: harden ACP failure boundaries after review

Deep review found several paths that made ACP communication failures look normal: prompt errors could finish as end_turn, permission pipeline exceptions could fall through to client approval, tool rawInput was deep-copied with JSON, and acp-link accepted unbounded or unvalidated WebSocket payloads. This keeps the behavior fail-closed, validates WS payloads before dispatch, caps payload size before JSON parse, and preserves cancellation intent with a generation counter.

Constraint: User explicitly rejected pseudo-fixes, fallback behavior, and unbounded payload handling

Rejected: Keep JSON stringify/parse rawInput copy | duplicates large payloads and silently drops non-JSON inputs

Rejected: Delegate permission pipeline errors to client approval | allows a broken local permission check to be bypassed

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Directive: Do not convert ACP errors into normal end_turn responses without a protocol-level reason and regression tests

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts

Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit

Tested: bunx biome lint src/ packages/acp-link/src/

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: bun run build

Not-tested: Manual end-to-end ACP client session over a real editor WebSocket

* fix: prevent ACP coverage runs from seeing partial mocks

GitHub Actions failed under bun test --coverage because permissions.test.ts replaced ../bridge.js with a partial mock that omitted forwardSessionUpdates. Coverage worker ordering on Linux let sibling tests observe that incomplete module.

This isolates ACP test mocks by snapshotting real exports, overriding only requested symbols, and restoring mocks in LIFO order. The shared helper also keeps the same behavior in agent.test.ts without duplicating mock infrastructure.

Constraint: bun:test mock.module is process-global inside a worker.

Rejected: Add fallback exports or production guards | the bridge export exists; the failure was test mock pollution.

Rejected: Keep per-file helper copies | duplication would let restore semantics drift again.

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Prefer safeMockModule for partial mocks of real modules in ACP tests; plain mock.module is only appropriate for fully synthetic modules or isolated tests.

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts

Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: git diff --check

Not-tested: Linux runner directly before push

* fix: normalize ACP bypass requests without warning noise

The previous CI repair removed the failing partial bridge mock, but it also added a shared safeMockModule helper and left the acp-link bypass normalization warning in the real new_session path.

This tightens the fix: acp-link now treats an unauthorized client bypass request as normal permission-mode normalization without emitting a warning, and the ACP permission test explicitly preserves the real bridge and permission exports instead of using a shared helper. The agent test keeps its local mock preservation but names it by behavior and restores mocks in LIFO order.

Constraint: CI output should not contain expected warning noise for covered policy branches.

Rejected: Silence the test only | the normal new_session path would still warn for an expected normalization branch.

Rejected: Keep the shared safeMockModule helper | the failing module was specific and should be fixed by preserving real exports at the mocking site.

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Treat client-requested bypassPermissions as data to normalize unless the local default explicitly enables bypass.

Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts

Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov with UPPER_WARN_COUNT=0

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit

Tested: git diff --check

* fix: harden ACP bypass and CI warning gates

ACP clients must not be able to enter bypassPermissions unless the local ACP gate and process environment both allow it. The same gate now controls session creation, explicit mode changes, and the ExitPlanMode option list, while session setup restores process.cwd so coverage and later work do not inherit ACP session state.

Constraint: CI must stay warning-clean without hiding real ACP permission failures

Rejected: Logging rejected bypass requests on the normal new_session path | it preserves audit text but reintroduces warning noise the runtime should not emit

Rejected: Broad CI=true postinstall skip | it hides explicit Chrome MCP setup checks outside the install path

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Directive: Keep bypassPermissions gated through one ACP availability decision before exposing it to clients

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: bun run build:vite with zero warning matches

Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter lcov --coverage-dir coverage produced non-empty lcov with SF records and zero filtered warning matches

Not-tested: GitHub Actions result after this push

* fix: remove remaining CI warning noise

The CI log still had three non-failing warnings after the ACP hardening commit: git init default-branch advice from checkout, a Node 20 action-runtime deprecation, and one additional known Vite dynamic-import diagnostic that only surfaced on Linux. The workflow now provides explicit git config and opts actions into Node 24, while Vite keeps a narrow allowlist for acknowledged optimizer diagnostics.

Constraint: Do not use shell log filtering to hide warnings after they happen

Rejected: Grep warning lines out of CI output | it would make future diagnostics harder to find

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Add new Vite warning allowlist entries only after checking that they are existing optimizer diagnostics, not new application defects

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false

Tested: bunx biome lint .github/workflows/ci.yml vite.config.ts

Tested: bun run build:vite with zero warning matches

Not-tested: GitHub Actions result after this push

* fix: reject unauthorized ACP bypass and harden CI actions

ACP clients now fail closed when permissionMode is malformed, unknown, or requests bypass without a local bypass opt-in. acp-link validates new_session input before forwarding to the agent and returns client error frames for expected unauthorized requests without logging create-failed noise. The direct AcpAgent path independently rejects invalid _meta.permissionMode and unauthorized bypass instead of falling back to settings.

CI workflows and generated GitHub App templates now use Node 24-compatible actions pinned to immutable commit SHAs, and acp-link startup output no longer prints the auth token.

Constraint: Must not hide warnings with test isolation or log filtering

Rejected: Silent fallback to local permission mode | accepts invalid client intent and masks boundary behavior

Rejected: Broad dependency churn from bun update | audit remained failing while package and lockfile churn expanded scope

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Directive: Client-provided permissionMode must stay fail-closed before reaching AcpAgent; only local settings.defaultMode may fall back to default on invalid local config

Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts src/services/skillLearning/__tests__/skillLifecycle.test.ts src/utils/settings/__tests__/config.test.ts

Tested: bunx tsc -p packages/acp-link/tsconfig.json --noEmit --pretty false

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: local CI equivalent install/typecheck/coverage/build with warning_scan=0

Not-tested: Pre-existing bun audit vulnerabilities require a separate dependency-hardening PR

* fix: resolve dependency audit findings precisely

Use dependency-native upgrades and lockfile resolution to close the audit findings without suppressions. Keep the chrome MCP setup aligned with the new dependency graph and add real integration coverage so the override behavior stays verified.

Constraint: no audit ignores or warning suppression
Rejected: broad google-auth/protobuf overrides | replaced with upstream-compatible resolution
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: keep dependency fixes upstream-compatible; do not reintroduce blanket overrides unless the audit surface changes materially
Tested: bun audit; bun audit --json; bun install --frozen-lockfile with CLAUDE_CODE_SKIP_CHROME_MCP_SETUP=1; bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false; bun run lint; targeted tests; bun run test:all; bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter lcov --coverage-dir coverage; bun run build:vite
Not-tested: unrelated pre-existing ACP/CORS/token fallback residual risks

* fix: keep ACP auth tokens out of URLs

Replace the ad hoc URL-token flow with crypto UUID-backed transport identifiers so the bearer token stays in structured request data instead of query strings. Keep the server, web client, and transport helpers aligned so the ACP/RCS handshake remains compatible after the API shape change.

Constraint: token must not be embedded in the URL
Rejected: token-as-uuid query fallback | leaked bearer tokens in URLs
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: preserve the structured auth path; do not reintroduce query-token fallback when adjusting ACP transport code
Tested: targeted ACP/RCS transport tests
Not-tested: unrelated pre-existing ACP/CORS/token fallback residual risks

* fix: normalize WebFetch request headers

Normalize WebFetch headers before dispatch so canonicalization preserves auth semantics and duplicate forms do not slip through. Keep the behavior locked with a focused header test instead of broadening the request pipeline.

Constraint: preserve header semantics without widening the fetch surface
Rejected: ad hoc caller-side normalization | too easy to bypass in future call sites
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: keep header normalization close to the WebFetch utility so future callers inherit the same behavior automatically
Tested: targeted WebFetch header tests
Not-tested: unrelated fetch backend behavior beyond header normalization

* fix: harden ACP remote auth surfaces

Tighten the remaining Claude security artifact items by requiring API keys on ACP global reads and relay upgrades, moving WebSocket tokens out of URLs, and replacing open web CORS with an explicit allowlist.

Constraint: Browser WebSocket clients cannot set arbitrary Authorization headers, so the token is carried in a selected subprotocol instead of a query string.
Rejected: Keep UUID auth for ACP channel groups | any caller can mint a UUID and read global ACP data.
Rejected: Preserve ?token= compatibility | secrets leak into logs, history, referrers, and intermediaries.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Do not reintroduce query-string bearer tokens; use Authorization or rcs.auth.<base64url-token>.
Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false
Tested: bun run typecheck in packages/remote-control-server
Tested: bun run build in packages/acp-link
Tested: bun run lint
Tested: bun audit
Tested: focused RCS/acp-link/web tests, 160 pass
Tested: Edge headless browser WebSocket subprotocol handshake
Tested: bun run test:all, 3669 pass
Tested: bun run build:vite
Tested: bun run build
Not-tested: Manual end-to-end relay with a live external ACP agent

* fix: resolve CI dependency override lookup

The CI runner does not expose @grpc/proto-loader as a root-resolvable package, and the test was relying on local hoisting rather than the real dependency owner. Resolve proto-loader through @opentelemetry/exporter-trace-otlp-grpc and @grpc/grpc-js so the smoke test follows the package graph it is validating.

Constraint: Do not add a new root dependency for a transitive smoke test.

Rejected: Skip or weaken the test | the test protects the protobuf 7 override path and should keep exercising loadSync.

Rejected: Add @grpc/proto-loader directly to root package.json | that hides the owning-package resolution issue and broadens dependency surface.

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Dependency override smoke tests should resolve from the package that actually owns the dependency, not from incidental root hoisting.

Tested: bun test tests/integration/dependency-overrides.test.ts; bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false; bun run lint; bun audit; bun run test:all; git diff --check

---------

Co-authored-by: unraid <local@unraid.local>
2026-04-26 19:49:54 +08:00

1168 lines
35 KiB
TypeScript

import { spawn, type ChildProcess } from "node:child_process";
import { createServer as createHttpsServer } from "node:https";
import { Writable, Readable } from "node:stream";
import * as acp from "@agentclientprotocol/sdk";
import { Hono } from "hono";
import { serve } from "@hono/node-server";
import { createNodeWebSocket } from "@hono/node-ws";
import type { WSContext } from "hono/ws";
import type { WebSocket as RawWebSocket } from "ws";
import { createLogger } from "./logger.js";
import { getOrCreateCertificate, getLanIPs } from "./cert.js";
import { RcsUpstreamClient, type RcsUpstreamConfig } from "./rcs-upstream.js";
import {
decodeJsonWsMessage,
WsPayloadTooLargeError,
} from "./ws-message.js";
import { authTokensEqual, extractWebSocketAuthToken } from "./ws-auth.js";
export { MAX_CLIENT_WS_PAYLOAD_BYTES } from "./ws-message.js";
export interface ServerConfig {
port: number;
host: string;
command: string;
args: string[];
cwd: string;
debug?: boolean;
token?: string;
https?: boolean;
/** Default permission mode for new sessions (e.g. "auto", "default", "bypassPermissions") */
permissionMode?: string;
/** Channel group ID for RCS registration */
group?: string;
}
// Pending permission request
interface PendingPermission {
resolve: (outcome: { outcome: "cancelled" } | { outcome: "selected"; optionId: string }) => void;
timeout: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>;
}
// PromptCapabilities from ACP protocol
// Reference: Zed's prompt_capabilities to check image support
interface PromptCapabilities {
audio?: boolean;
embeddedContext?: boolean;
image?: boolean;
}
// SessionModelState from ACP protocol
// Reference: Zed's AgentModelSelector reads from state.available_models
interface SessionModelState {
availableModels: Array<{
modelId: string;
name: string;
description?: string | null;
}>;
currentModelId: string;
}
// AgentCapabilities from ACP protocol
// Reference: Zed's AcpConnection.agent_capabilities
// Matches SDK's AgentCapabilities exactly
interface AgentCapabilities {
_meta?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
loadSession?: boolean;
mcpCapabilities?: {
_meta?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
clientServers?: boolean;
};
promptCapabilities?: PromptCapabilities;
sessionCapabilities?: {
_meta?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
fork?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
list?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
resume?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
};
}
// Track connected clients and their agent connections
interface ClientState {
process: ChildProcess | null;
connection: acp.ClientSideConnection | null;
sessionId: string | null;
pendingPermissions: Map<string, PendingPermission>;
agentCapabilities: AgentCapabilities | null;
promptCapabilities: PromptCapabilities | null;
modelState: SessionModelState | null;
isAlive: boolean;
}
// Module-level state (set when server starts)
let AGENT_COMMAND: string;
let AGENT_ARGS: string[];
let AGENT_CWD: string;
let SERVER_PORT: number;
let SERVER_HOST: string;
let AUTH_TOKEN: string | undefined;
let DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE: string | undefined;
const clients = new Map<WSContext, ClientState>();
// Module-scoped child loggers
const logWs = createLogger("ws");
const logAgent = createLogger("agent");
const logSession = createLogger("session");
const logPrompt = createLogger("prompt");
const logPerm = createLogger("perm");
const logRelay = createLogger("relay");
const logServer = createLogger("server");
// RCS upstream client (optional — enabled via ACP_RCS_URL env var)
let rcsUpstream: RcsUpstreamClient | null = null;
/**
* Create a virtual WSContext for RCS relay messages.
* Responses via send() go to RCS upstream (not a local WS).
*/
function createRelayWs(): WSContext {
return {
get readyState() { return 1; }, // always OPEN
send: () => {}, // no-op — responses go through rcsUpstream.send()
close: () => {},
raw: null,
isInner: false,
url: "",
origin: "",
protocol: "",
} as unknown as WSContext;
}
// Permission request timeout (5 minutes)
const PERMISSION_TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
// Heartbeat interval for WebSocket ping/pong (30 seconds)
const HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS = 30_000;
// Generate unique request ID
function generateRequestId(): string {
return `perm_${Date.now()}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 11)}`;
}
// Send a message to the WebSocket client (and optionally forward to RCS upstream)
function send(ws: WSContext, type: string, payload?: unknown): void {
if (ws.readyState === 1) {
// WebSocket.OPEN
ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type, payload }));
}
// Forward to RCS upstream if connected
if (rcsUpstream?.isRegistered()) {
rcsUpstream.send({ type, payload });
}
}
// Create a Client implementation that forwards events to WebSocket
function createClient(ws: WSContext, clientState: ClientState): acp.Client {
return {
async requestPermission(params) {
const requestId = generateRequestId();
logPerm.debug({ requestId, title: params.toolCall.title }, "requested");
const outcomePromise = new Promise<{ outcome: "cancelled" } | { outcome: "selected"; optionId: string }>((resolve) => {
const timeout = setTimeout(() => {
logPerm.warn({ requestId }, "timed out");
clientState.pendingPermissions.delete(requestId);
resolve({ outcome: "cancelled" });
}, PERMISSION_TIMEOUT_MS);
clientState.pendingPermissions.set(requestId, { resolve, timeout });
});
send(ws, "permission_request", {
requestId,
sessionId: params.sessionId,
options: params.options,
toolCall: params.toolCall,
});
const outcome = await outcomePromise;
logPerm.debug({ requestId, outcome: outcome.outcome }, "resolved");
return { outcome };
},
async sessionUpdate(params) {
send(ws, "session_update", params);
},
async readTextFile(params) {
logWs.debug({ path: params.path }, "readTextFile");
return { content: "" };
},
async writeTextFile(params) {
logWs.debug({ path: params.path }, "writeTextFile");
return {};
},
};
}
// Handle permission response from client
function handlePermissionResponse(ws: WSContext, payload: { requestId: string; outcome: { outcome: "cancelled" } | { outcome: "selected"; optionId: string } }): void {
const state = clients.get(ws);
if (!state) {
logPerm.warn("response from unknown client");
return;
}
const pending = state.pendingPermissions.get(payload.requestId);
if (!pending) {
logPerm.warn({ requestId: payload.requestId }, "response for unknown request");
return;
}
clearTimeout(pending.timeout);
state.pendingPermissions.delete(payload.requestId);
pending.resolve(payload.outcome);
}
// Cancel all pending permissions for a client (called on disconnect)
function cancelPendingPermissions(clientState: ClientState): void {
for (const [requestId, pending] of clientState.pendingPermissions) {
logPerm.debug({ requestId }, "cancelled on disconnect");
clearTimeout(pending.timeout);
pending.resolve({ outcome: "cancelled" });
}
clientState.pendingPermissions.clear();
}
async function handleConnect(ws: WSContext): Promise<void> {
const state = clients.get(ws);
if (!state) return;
// If already connected to a running agent, just resend status
// This handles frontend reconnections without restarting the agent process
// Check both .killed and .exitCode to detect crashed processes
if (state.connection && state.process && !state.process.killed && state.process.exitCode === null) {
logAgent.info("already connected, resending status");
send(ws, "status", {
connected: true,
agentInfo: { name: AGENT_COMMAND },
capabilities: state.agentCapabilities,
});
return;
}
// Kill existing process if any (only if not healthy)
if (state.process) {
cancelPendingPermissions(state);
state.process.kill();
state.process = null;
state.connection = null;
}
try {
logAgent.info({ command: AGENT_COMMAND, args: AGENT_ARGS }, "spawning");
const agentProcess = spawn(AGENT_COMMAND, AGENT_ARGS, {
cwd: AGENT_CWD,
stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "inherit"],
env: buildAgentEnv(),
});
state.process = agentProcess;
// Clean up state when agent process exits unexpectedly
agentProcess.on("exit", (code) => {
logAgent.info({ exitCode: code }, "agent process exited");
// Only clear if this is still the current process
if (state.process === agentProcess) {
state.process = null;
state.connection = null;
state.sessionId = null;
}
});
const input = Writable.toWeb(agentProcess.stdin!) as unknown as WritableStream<Uint8Array>;
const output = Readable.toWeb(agentProcess.stdout!) as unknown as ReadableStream<Uint8Array>;
const stream = acp.ndJsonStream(input, output);
const connection = new acp.ClientSideConnection(
(_agent) => createClient(ws, state),
stream,
);
state.connection = connection;
const initResult = await connection.initialize({
protocolVersion: acp.PROTOCOL_VERSION,
clientInfo: { name: "zed", version: "1.0.0" },
clientCapabilities: {
fs: { readTextFile: true, writeTextFile: true },
},
});
const agentCaps = initResult.agentCapabilities;
state.agentCapabilities = agentCaps ? {
_meta: agentCaps._meta,
loadSession: agentCaps.loadSession,
mcpCapabilities: agentCaps.mcpCapabilities,
promptCapabilities: agentCaps.promptCapabilities,
sessionCapabilities: agentCaps.sessionCapabilities,
} : null;
state.promptCapabilities = agentCaps?.promptCapabilities ?? null;
logAgent.info({
protocolVersion: initResult.protocolVersion,
loadSession: !!state.agentCapabilities?.loadSession,
sessionList: !!state.agentCapabilities?.sessionCapabilities?.list,
sessionResume: !!state.agentCapabilities?.sessionCapabilities?.resume,
hasMcp: !!state.agentCapabilities?.mcpCapabilities,
}, "initialized");
send(ws, "status", {
connected: true,
agentInfo: initResult.agentInfo,
capabilities: state.agentCapabilities,
});
connection.closed.then(() => {
logAgent.info("connection closed");
state.connection = null;
state.sessionId = null;
send(ws, "status", { connected: false });
});
} catch (error) {
logAgent.error({ error: (error as Error).message }, "connect failed");
send(ws, "error", { message: `Failed to connect: ${(error as Error).message}` });
}
}
async function handleNewSession(
ws: WSContext,
params: { cwd?: string; permissionMode?: string },
): Promise<void> {
const state = clients.get(ws);
if (!state?.connection) {
logAgent.warn({ hasState: !!state, hasProcess: !!state?.process, processKilled: state?.process?.killed, exitCode: state?.process?.exitCode }, "handleNewSession: not connected to agent");
send(ws, "error", { message: "Not connected to agent" });
return;
}
try {
const sessionCwd = params.cwd || AGENT_CWD;
let permissionMode: string | undefined;
try {
permissionMode = resolveNewSessionPermissionMode(
params.permissionMode,
DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE,
);
} catch (error) {
send(ws, "error", { message: (error as Error).message });
return;
}
const result = await state.connection.newSession({
cwd: sessionCwd,
mcpServers: [],
...(permissionMode ? { _meta: { permissionMode } } : {}),
});
state.sessionId = result.sessionId;
state.modelState = result.models ?? null;
logSession.info({ sessionId: result.sessionId, cwd: sessionCwd, hasModels: !!result.models }, "created");
send(ws, "session_created", {
...result,
promptCapabilities: state.promptCapabilities,
models: state.modelState,
});
} catch (error) {
logSession.error({ error: (error as Error).message }, "create failed");
send(ws, "error", { message: `Failed to create session: ${(error as Error).message}` });
}
}
// ============================================================================
// Session History Operations
// Reference: Zed's AgentConnection trait - list_sessions, load_session, resume_session
// ============================================================================
async function handleListSessions(
ws: WSContext,
params: { cwd?: string; cursor?: string },
): Promise<void> {
const state = clients.get(ws);
if (!state?.connection) {
logAgent.warn({ hasState: !!state, hasProcess: !!state?.process, processKilled: state?.process?.killed, exitCode: state?.process?.exitCode }, "handleListSessions: not connected to agent");
send(ws, "error", { message: "Not connected to agent" });
return;
}
if (!state.agentCapabilities?.sessionCapabilities?.list) {
send(ws, "error", { message: "Listing sessions is not supported by this agent" });
return;
}
try {
const result = await state.connection.listSessions({
cwd: params.cwd,
cursor: params.cursor,
});
const MAX_SESSIONS = 20;
const sessions = result.sessions.slice(0, MAX_SESSIONS);
logSession.info({ total: result.sessions.length, returned: sessions.length, hasMore: !!result.nextCursor }, "listed");
send(ws, "session_list", {
sessions: sessions.map((s: acp.SessionInfo) => ({
_meta: s._meta,
cwd: s.cwd,
sessionId: s.sessionId,
title: s.title,
updatedAt: s.updatedAt,
})),
nextCursor: result.nextCursor,
_meta: result._meta,
});
} catch (error) {
logSession.error({ error: (error as Error).message }, "list failed");
send(ws, "error", { message: `Failed to list sessions: ${(error as Error).message}` });
}
}
async function handleLoadSession(
ws: WSContext,
params: { sessionId: string; cwd?: string },
): Promise<void> {
const state = clients.get(ws);
if (!state?.connection) {
logAgent.warn({ hasState: !!state, hasProcess: !!state?.process, processKilled: state?.process?.killed, exitCode: state?.process?.exitCode }, "handleLoadSession: not connected to agent");
send(ws, "error", { message: "Not connected to agent" });
return;
}
if (!state.agentCapabilities?.loadSession) {
send(ws, "error", { message: "Loading sessions is not supported by this agent" });
return;
}
try {
const sessionCwd = params.cwd || AGENT_CWD;
const sessionId = params.sessionId;
const result = await state.connection.loadSession({
sessionId,
cwd: sessionCwd,
mcpServers: [],
});
state.sessionId = sessionId;
state.modelState = result.models ?? null;
logSession.info({ sessionId, cwd: sessionCwd }, "loaded");
send(ws, "session_loaded", {
sessionId,
promptCapabilities: state.promptCapabilities,
models: state.modelState,
});
} catch (error) {
logSession.error({ error: (error as Error).message }, "load failed");
send(ws, "error", { message: `Failed to load session: ${(error as Error).message}` });
}
}
async function handleResumeSession(
ws: WSContext,
params: { sessionId: string; cwd?: string },
): Promise<void> {
const state = clients.get(ws);
if (!state?.connection) {
logAgent.warn({ hasState: !!state, hasProcess: !!state?.process, processKilled: state?.process?.killed, exitCode: state?.process?.exitCode }, "handleResumeSession: not connected to agent");
send(ws, "error", { message: "Not connected to agent" });
return;
}
if (!state.agentCapabilities?.sessionCapabilities?.resume) {
send(ws, "error", { message: "Resuming sessions is not supported by this agent" });
return;
}
try {
const sessionCwd = params.cwd || AGENT_CWD;
const sessionId = params.sessionId;
const result = await state.connection.unstable_resumeSession({
sessionId,
cwd: sessionCwd,
});
state.sessionId = sessionId;
state.modelState = result.models ?? null;
logSession.info({ sessionId, cwd: sessionCwd }, "resumed");
send(ws, "session_resumed", {
sessionId,
promptCapabilities: state.promptCapabilities,
models: state.modelState,
});
} catch (error) {
logSession.error({ error: (error as Error).message }, "resume failed");
send(ws, "error", { message: `Failed to resume session: ${(error as Error).message}` });
}
}
// Reference: Zed's AcpThread.send() forwards Vec<acp::ContentBlock> to agent
async function handlePrompt(
ws: WSContext,
params: { content: ContentBlock[] },
): Promise<void> {
const state = clients.get(ws);
if (!state?.connection || !state.sessionId) {
send(ws, "error", { message: "No active session" });
return;
}
try {
const firstText = params.content.find(b => b.type === "text")?.text;
const images = params.content.filter(b => b.type === "image");
logPrompt.debug({
text: firstText?.slice(0, 100),
imageCount: images.length,
blockCount: params.content.length,
}, "sending");
const result = await state.connection.prompt({
sessionId: state.sessionId,
prompt: params.content as acp.ContentBlock[],
});
logPrompt.info({ stopReason: result.stopReason }, "completed");
send(ws, "prompt_complete", result);
} catch (error) {
logPrompt.error({ error: (error as Error).message }, "failed");
send(ws, "error", { message: `Prompt failed: ${(error as Error).message}` });
}
}
function handleDisconnect(ws: WSContext): void {
const state = clients.get(ws);
if (!state) return;
if (state.process) {
state.process.kill();
state.process = null;
}
state.connection = null;
state.sessionId = null;
send(ws, "status", { connected: false });
}
// Handle cancel request from client
async function handleCancel(ws: WSContext): Promise<void> {
const state = clients.get(ws);
if (!state?.connection || !state.sessionId) {
logWs.warn("cancel requested but no active session");
return;
}
logSession.info({ sessionId: state.sessionId }, "cancel requested");
cancelPendingPermissions(state);
try {
await state.connection.cancel({ sessionId: state.sessionId });
logSession.info({ sessionId: state.sessionId }, "cancel sent");
} catch (error) {
logSession.error({ error: (error as Error).message }, "cancel failed");
}
}
// Reference: Zed's AgentModelSelector.select_model() calls connection.set_session_model()
async function handleSetSessionModel(
ws: WSContext,
params: { modelId: string },
): Promise<void> {
const state = clients.get(ws);
if (!state?.connection || !state.sessionId) {
send(ws, "error", { message: "No active session" });
return;
}
if (!state.modelState) {
send(ws, "error", { message: "Model selection not supported by this agent" });
return;
}
try {
logSession.info({ sessionId: state.sessionId, modelId: params.modelId }, "setting model");
await state.connection.unstable_setSessionModel({
sessionId: state.sessionId,
modelId: params.modelId,
});
state.modelState = { ...state.modelState, currentModelId: params.modelId };
send(ws, "model_changed", { modelId: params.modelId });
logSession.info({ modelId: params.modelId }, "model changed");
} catch (error) {
logSession.error({ error: (error as Error).message }, "set model failed");
send(ws, "error", { message: `Failed to set model: ${(error as Error).message}` });
}
}
// ContentBlock type matching @agentclientprotocol/sdk
interface ContentBlock {
type: string;
text?: string;
data?: string;
mimeType?: string;
uri?: string;
name?: string;
}
type PermissionResponsePayload = {
requestId: string;
outcome: { outcome: "cancelled" } | { outcome: "selected"; optionId: string };
};
type ProxyMessage =
| { type: "connect" }
| { type: "disconnect" }
| { type: "new_session"; payload: { cwd?: string; permissionMode?: string } }
| { type: "prompt"; payload: { content: ContentBlock[] } }
| { type: "permission_response"; payload: PermissionResponsePayload }
| { type: "cancel" }
| { type: "set_session_model"; payload: { modelId: string } }
| { type: "list_sessions"; payload: { cwd?: string; cursor?: string } }
| { type: "load_session"; payload: { sessionId: string; cwd?: string } }
| { type: "resume_session"; payload: { sessionId: string; cwd?: string } }
| { type: "ping" };
function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
}
function optionalString(value: unknown): string | undefined {
return typeof value === "string" ? value : undefined;
}
function optionalStringField(
payload: Record<string, unknown>,
key: string,
source: string,
): string | undefined {
if (!Object.hasOwn(payload, key)) return undefined;
const value = payload[key];
if (typeof value === "string") return value;
throw new Error(`Invalid ${source}: expected a string`);
}
function payloadRecord(value: unknown, type: string): Record<string, unknown> {
if (!isRecord(value)) {
throw new Error(`Invalid ${type} payload`);
}
return value;
}
function optionalPayloadRecord(value: unknown, type: string): Record<string, unknown> {
if (value === undefined) return {};
return payloadRecord(value, type);
}
function optionalRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> {
return isRecord(value) ? value : {};
}
function decodeContentBlocks(value: unknown): ContentBlock[] {
if (
!Array.isArray(value) ||
!value.every(block => isRecord(block) && typeof block.type === "string")
) {
throw new Error("Invalid prompt payload");
}
return value as ContentBlock[];
}
function decodePermissionResponsePayload(value: unknown): PermissionResponsePayload {
const payload = payloadRecord(value, "permission_response");
if (typeof payload.requestId !== "string" || !isRecord(payload.outcome)) {
throw new Error("Invalid permission_response payload");
}
if (payload.outcome.outcome === "cancelled") {
return { requestId: payload.requestId, outcome: { outcome: "cancelled" } };
}
if (
payload.outcome.outcome === "selected" &&
typeof payload.outcome.optionId === "string"
) {
return {
requestId: payload.requestId,
outcome: { outcome: "selected", optionId: payload.outcome.optionId },
};
}
throw new Error("Invalid permission_response payload");
}
function decodeClientMessage(message: Record<string, unknown>): ProxyMessage {
if (typeof message.type !== "string") {
throw new Error("Invalid WebSocket message payload");
}
switch (message.type) {
case "connect":
case "disconnect":
case "cancel":
case "ping":
return { type: message.type };
case "new_session": {
const payload = optionalPayloadRecord(message.payload, "new_session");
return {
type: "new_session",
payload: {
cwd: optionalStringField(payload, "cwd", "new_session.cwd"),
permissionMode: optionalStringField(
payload,
"permissionMode",
"new_session.permissionMode",
),
},
};
}
case "prompt": {
const payload = payloadRecord(message.payload, "prompt");
return {
type: "prompt",
payload: { content: decodeContentBlocks(payload.content) },
};
}
case "permission_response":
return {
type: "permission_response",
payload: decodePermissionResponsePayload(message.payload),
};
case "set_session_model": {
const payload = payloadRecord(message.payload, "set_session_model");
if (typeof payload.modelId !== "string") {
throw new Error("Invalid set_session_model payload");
}
return { type: "set_session_model", payload: { modelId: payload.modelId } };
}
case "list_sessions": {
const payload = optionalRecord(message.payload);
return {
type: "list_sessions",
payload: {
cwd: optionalString(payload.cwd),
cursor: optionalString(payload.cursor),
},
};
}
case "load_session":
case "resume_session": {
const payload = payloadRecord(message.payload, message.type);
if (typeof payload.sessionId !== "string") {
throw new Error(`Invalid ${message.type} payload`);
}
return {
type: message.type,
payload: {
sessionId: payload.sessionId,
cwd: optionalString(payload.cwd),
},
};
}
default:
throw new Error(`Unknown message type: ${message.type}`);
}
}
export function decodeClientWsMessage(data: unknown): ProxyMessage {
return decodeClientMessage(decodeJsonWsMessage(data));
}
async function dispatchClientMessage(ws: WSContext, data: ProxyMessage): Promise<void> {
switch (data.type) {
case "connect":
await handleConnect(ws);
break;
case "disconnect":
handleDisconnect(ws);
break;
case "new_session":
await handleNewSession(ws, data.payload);
break;
case "prompt":
await handlePrompt(ws, data.payload);
break;
case "permission_response":
handlePermissionResponse(ws, data.payload);
break;
case "cancel":
await handleCancel(ws);
break;
case "set_session_model":
await handleSetSessionModel(ws, data.payload);
break;
case "list_sessions":
await handleListSessions(ws, data.payload);
break;
case "load_session":
await handleLoadSession(ws, data.payload);
break;
case "resume_session":
await handleResumeSession(ws, data.payload);
break;
case "ping":
send(ws, "pong");
break;
}
}
export const __testing = {
dispatchClientMessage(
ws: WSContext,
data: unknown,
): Promise<void> {
assertTestingInternalsEnabled();
return dispatchClientMessage(ws, data as ProxyMessage);
},
registerClient(
ws: WSContext,
state: {
connection?: unknown;
process?: ChildProcess | null;
sessionId?: string | null;
},
): () => void {
assertTestingInternalsEnabled();
clients.set(ws, {
process: state.process ?? null,
connection: (state.connection ?? null) as acp.ClientSideConnection | null,
sessionId: state.sessionId ?? null,
pendingPermissions: new Map(),
agentCapabilities: null,
promptCapabilities: null,
modelState: null,
isAlive: true,
});
return () => {
clients.delete(ws);
};
},
getClientSessionId(ws: WSContext): string | null | undefined {
assertTestingInternalsEnabled();
return clients.get(ws)?.sessionId;
},
setDefaultPermissionMode(mode: string | undefined): () => void {
assertTestingInternalsEnabled();
const previous = DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE;
DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE = mode;
return () => {
DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE = previous;
};
},
};
function assertTestingInternalsEnabled(): void {
if (process.env.ACP_LINK_TEST_INTERNALS === "1") {
return;
}
throw new Error(
"acp-link test internals are disabled outside test execution.",
);
}
const ACP_LINK_PERMISSION_MODE_ALIASES = {
auto: "auto",
default: "default",
acceptedits: "acceptEdits",
dontask: "dontAsk",
plan: "plan",
bypasspermissions: "bypassPermissions",
bypass: "bypassPermissions",
} as const;
type AcpLinkPermissionMode =
(typeof ACP_LINK_PERMISSION_MODE_ALIASES)[keyof typeof ACP_LINK_PERMISSION_MODE_ALIASES];
export function resolveNewSessionPermissionMode(
requestedMode: string | undefined,
defaultMode: string | undefined,
): string | undefined {
const requested = resolveAcpLinkPermissionMode(requestedMode);
const localDefault = resolveAcpLinkPermissionMode(defaultMode);
if (!requested) {
return localDefault;
}
if (requested !== "bypassPermissions") {
return requested;
}
if (localDefault === "bypassPermissions") {
return "bypassPermissions";
}
throw new Error(
"bypassPermissions requires local ACP_PERMISSION_MODE=bypassPermissions before a client can request it.",
);
}
function resolveAcpLinkPermissionMode(
mode: string | undefined,
): AcpLinkPermissionMode | undefined {
if (mode === undefined) return undefined;
const normalized = mode?.trim().toLowerCase();
if (!normalized) {
throw new Error("Invalid permissionMode: expected a non-empty string.");
}
const resolved =
ACP_LINK_PERMISSION_MODE_ALIASES[
normalized as keyof typeof ACP_LINK_PERMISSION_MODE_ALIASES
];
if (!resolved) {
throw new Error(`Invalid permissionMode: ${mode}.`);
}
return resolved;
}
function buildAgentEnv(): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {
if (!DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE) {
return process.env;
}
return {
...process.env,
ACP_PERMISSION_MODE: DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE,
};
}
export async function startServer(config: ServerConfig): Promise<void> {
const { port, host, command, args, cwd, token, https } = config;
// Set module-level config
AGENT_COMMAND = command;
AGENT_ARGS = args;
AGENT_CWD = cwd;
SERVER_PORT = port;
SERVER_HOST = host;
AUTH_TOKEN = token;
DEFAULT_PERMISSION_MODE = config.permissionMode || process.env.ACP_PERMISSION_MODE;
// Initialize RCS upstream client if configured
const rcsUrl = process.env.ACP_RCS_URL;
const rcsToken = process.env.ACP_RCS_TOKEN;
const rcsGroup = config.group || process.env.ACP_RCS_GROUP;
if (rcsGroup && !/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(rcsGroup)) {
throw new Error(`Invalid ACP_RCS_GROUP "${rcsGroup}": only letters, digits, hyphens, and underscores are allowed`);
}
if (rcsUrl) {
rcsUpstream = new RcsUpstreamClient({
rcsUrl,
apiToken: rcsToken || "",
agentName: command,
channelGroupId: rcsGroup || undefined,
maxSessions: 1,
});
const relayWs = createRelayWs();
const relayState: ClientState = {
process: null,
connection: null,
sessionId: null,
pendingPermissions: new Map(),
agentCapabilities: null,
promptCapabilities: null,
modelState: null,
isAlive: true,
};
clients.set(relayWs, relayState);
rcsUpstream.setMessageHandler(async (msg) => {
try {
const data = decodeClientMessage(msg);
logRelay.debug({ type: data.type }, "processing");
await dispatchClientMessage(relayWs, data);
} catch (error) {
logRelay.error({ error: (error as Error).message }, "handler error");
}
});
rcsUpstream.connect().catch((err) => {
logRelay.warn({ error: (err as Error).message }, "initial connection failed");
});
logRelay.info({ url: rcsUrl }, "upstream enabled");
}
const app = new Hono();
const { injectWebSocket, upgradeWebSocket } = createNodeWebSocket({ app });
// Health check endpoint
app.get("/health", (c) => {
return c.json({ status: "ok" });
});
// WebSocket endpoint with token validation
app.get(
"/ws",
upgradeWebSocket((c) => {
if (AUTH_TOKEN) {
const providedToken = extractWebSocketAuthToken({
authorization: c.req.header("Authorization"),
protocol: c.req.header("Sec-WebSocket-Protocol"),
});
if (!authTokensEqual(providedToken, AUTH_TOKEN)) {
logWs.warn("connection rejected: invalid token");
return {
onOpen(_event, ws) {
ws.close(4001, "Unauthorized: Invalid token");
},
onMessage() {},
onClose() {},
};
}
}
return {
onOpen(_event, ws) {
logWs.info("client connected");
const state: ClientState = {
process: null,
connection: null,
sessionId: null,
pendingPermissions: new Map(),
agentCapabilities: null,
promptCapabilities: null,
modelState: null,
isAlive: true,
};
clients.set(ws, state);
const rawWs = ws.raw as RawWebSocket;
rawWs.on("pong", () => {
state.isAlive = true;
});
},
async onMessage(event, ws) {
try {
const data = decodeClientWsMessage(event.data);
logWs.debug({ type: data.type }, "received");
await dispatchClientMessage(ws, data);
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof WsPayloadTooLargeError) {
logWs.warn({ error: error.message }, "message too large");
ws.close(1009, "message too large");
return;
}
logWs.error({ error: (error as Error).message }, "message error");
send(ws, "error", { message: `Error: ${(error as Error).message}` });
}
},
onClose(_event, ws) {
logWs.info("client disconnected");
const state = clients.get(ws);
if (state) {
cancelPendingPermissions(state);
}
handleDisconnect(ws);
clients.delete(ws);
},
};
}),
);
// Create server with optional HTTPS
let server;
if (https) {
const tlsOptions = await getOrCreateCertificate();
server = serve({
fetch: app.fetch,
port,
hostname: host,
createServer: createHttpsServer,
serverOptions: tlsOptions,
});
} else {
server = serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port, hostname: host });
}
injectWebSocket(server);
// Heartbeat: periodically ping all connected clients
setInterval(() => {
for (const [ws, state] of clients) {
// Skip virtual relay connections (no raw socket, always alive)
if (!ws.raw && state.isAlive) continue;
if (!ws.raw) {
// Connection already closed, clean up
clients.delete(ws);
continue;
}
if (!state.isAlive) {
logWs.info("heartbeat timeout, terminating");
(ws.raw as RawWebSocket).terminate();
continue;
}
state.isAlive = false;
(ws.raw as RawWebSocket).ping();
}
}, HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS);
// Protocol strings based on HTTPS mode
const wsProtocol = https ? "wss" : "ws";
// Get actual LAN IP when binding to 0.0.0.0
let displayHost = host;
if (host === "0.0.0.0") {
const lanIPs = getLanIPs();
displayHost = lanIPs[0] || "localhost";
}
// Build URLs
const localWsUrl = `${wsProtocol}://localhost:${port}/ws`;
const networkWsUrl = `${wsProtocol}://${displayHost}:${port}/ws`;
// Print startup banner
console.log();
console.log(` 🚀 ACP Proxy Server${https ? " (HTTPS)" : ""}`);
console.log();
console.log(` Connection:`);
if (host === "0.0.0.0") {
console.log(` URL: ${networkWsUrl}`);
} else {
console.log(` URL: ${localWsUrl}`);
}
if (AUTH_TOKEN) {
console.log(` Token: configured`);
}
console.log();
if (!AUTH_TOKEN) {
console.log(` ⚠️ Authentication disabled (--no-auth)`);
console.log();
}
const agentDisplay = AGENT_ARGS.length > 0
? `${AGENT_COMMAND} ${AGENT_ARGS.join(" ")}`
: AGENT_COMMAND;
console.log(` 📦 Agent: ${agentDisplay}`);
console.log(` CWD: ${AGENT_CWD}`);
console.log();
console.log(` Press Ctrl+C to stop`);
console.log();
logServer.info({
port,
host,
https,
wsEndpoint: `${wsProtocol}://${displayHost}:${port}/ws`,
agent: AGENT_COMMAND,
agentArgs: AGENT_ARGS,
cwd: AGENT_CWD,
authEnabled: !!AUTH_TOKEN,
}, "started");
// Graceful shutdown — close RCS upstream
const shutdown = async () => {
if (rcsUpstream) {
await rcsUpstream.close();
}
process.exit(0);
};
process.on("SIGINT", shutdown);
process.on("SIGTERM", shutdown);
// Keep the server running
await new Promise(() => {});
}