claude-code/docs/jira/CROSS-AUDIT-2026-04-29.md

Cross-Audit 2026-04-29 — Stub Recovery Bugs

Scope: ~3.8k lines across 10 commands + claude.ts break-cache integration. Read-only audit.

A. Silent failures

• HIGH src/commands/break-cache/index.ts:60-62 — readStats swallows ALL errors (parse error, EACCES, EISDIR) and returns defaults. A corrupt stats file silently masks totalBreaks. Fix: log the error path, or rename file with .corrupt-<ts> suffix on JSON.parse failure.
• MEDIUM src/commands/share/index.ts:113-121, 117 — buildSummaryContent outer try/catch returns '' on read failure; caller treats '' as "no content found" and emits a misleading message. Fix: throw to let the caller surface the real error.
• MEDIUM src/commands/issue/index.ts:96-98, 121-123 — repoHasIssuesEnabled and detectIssueTemplate return null on any error including auth/network; user sees no signal that issue-template detection failed.
• LOW src/commands/perf-issue/index.ts:386-391 — analyzed = null on parse error → silently produces an all-zero report indistinguishable from a fresh session. Fix: include a parse_error note in the report.
• LOW src/services/api/claude.ts:1462-1466 — unlinkSync once-marker catch {} is intentional; safe but should log via debug.

B. Resource leaks

• MEDIUM src/commands/autofix-pr/launchAutofixPr.ts:255-263 — On teleport throw, clearActiveMonitor(taskId) is called which DOES abort the controller — OK. But if registerRemoteAgentTask throws (line 289), the remote CCR session is already created with no abort path; only local lock is released. Document or surface a "remote session orphaned, cancel from claude.ai" hint.
• LOW src/commands/autofix-pr/monitorState.ts:42-47 — clearActiveMonitor aborts the controller but never removes any registered listeners on the signal. Acceptable for a singleton with process-lifetime scope.
• PASS — share/index.ts mkdtempSync cleanup uses finally block; correct.

C. Concurrency / race

• HIGH src/commands/break-cache/index.ts:71-78, 169, 190 — incrementBreakCount and writes to break-cache-stats.json / .break-cache-always are NOT atomic. Two concurrent /break-cache once invocations lose one increment (read-modify-write race) and may also race with the unlinkSync in claude.ts:1463. Fix: write to a temp file then rename, or accept the race and document.
• PASS monitorState.ts:21-25 — trySetActiveMonitor is atomic in single-threaded JS event loop. Comment in launchAutofixPr.ts:166-169 correctly notes the await-free synchronous CAS.
• MEDIUM agents-platform/agentsApi.ts:102-121 — withRetry retries on 5xx but does NOT honor Retry-After headers; under sustained 5xx storm three concurrent listAgents calls will all hammer at exponential 0.5/1/2s.

D. Input validation / overflow

• HIGH src/commands/ctx_viz/index.ts:362-367 — --max-tokens=N accepts any positive int; passing --max-tokens=999999999999 produces slotSize ≈ 2e7 and Math.round(cacheRead/slotSize) underflows to 0; harmless but BAR_WIDTH math in renderPerTurnBreakdown (line 321 Math.max(1, Math.round(...))) emits at least 1 cell of color even for zero-token turns — misleading. Cap at e.g. 1e9.
• MEDIUM src/commands/perf-issue/index.ts:97 — readFileSync(logPath, 'utf8') reads the entire JSONL into memory; for long-running sessions transcripts can reach hundreds of MB → OOM risk. Same pattern in share/index.ts:88, issue/index.ts:143, ctx_viz/index.ts:226, debug-tool-call/index.ts:88. Fix: stream line-by-line via readline.
• MEDIUM src/commands/agents-platform/parseArgs.ts:29 — tokens.length < 6 requires at least 1 prompt token, but a multi-line prompt with quoted whitespace gets shredded (single-quote/double-quote not respected). Cron "0 9 * * 1" arg is split on spaces, producing 5 cron + N prompt tokens — user must NOT quote. Document or implement shell-style quoting.
• LOW src/commands/issue/index.ts:56-62 — owner/repo regex [\w.-]+ admits leading . / ..; combined with the URL fallback at line 354 produces https://github.com/.../...issues/new. Browsers tolerate it but a malformed remote URL leaks into the analytics event at line 441.
• LOW src/commands/share/index.ts:166-167 — if (!url.startsWith('https://')) rejects only obvious failures; a gh subprocess that prints https://attacker.example.com\nhttps://gist.github.com/... would pass since result.stdout.trim() keeps multi-line. Use .split('\n')[0].trim().

E. Path traversal / security

• MEDIUM src/commands/perf-issue/index.ts:379 — ${sessionId.slice(0, 8)} is interpolated into the report filename; if a malicious session id contained ../, mkdirSync({recursive:true}) would happily traverse. Mitigated by getSessionId() returning a trusted UUID, but defensive: sanitizePath(sessionId.slice(0,8)).
• MEDIUM src/commands/share/index.ts:179 — curl -F 'file=@${filePath}': filePath is mkdtempSync output so trusted; OK for now.
• MEDIUM src/commands/share/index.ts:42-69 — Secret-mask regex \b(sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}) is greedy and may mask non-secret strings (any base64 token starting with sk-). And the [0-9a-f]{32,64} MD5/SHA pattern (line 65) will mask legitimate git SHAs in the conversation, garbling the share. Acceptable trade-off but document.
• HIGH src/commands/issue/index.ts:343-376 — When gh is missing, body from session transcript is URL-encoded into a browser link with encodeURIComponent. Browsers cap URL length ~8000 chars; getTranscriptSummary(5) slices to 200 chars per turn × 10 entries + errors — fits, but no hard cap. Fix: clamp body to ~3000 chars before encode.
• MEDIUM src/commands/env/index.ts:34-46 — KAIROS allowlist (no underscore) matches any env var starting with KAIROS (e.g., KAIROSE_INTERNAL_TOKEN). Should be KAIROS_.
• MEDIUM src/commands/env/index.ts:25-32 — maskValue shows first 4 chars of secrets ≥ 9 chars; sk-ant-… prefix leak (4 chars) is borderline. Acceptable; but <= 8 falls back to *** which is fine.

F. Error matrix

• MEDIUM src/commands/teleport/launchTeleport.ts:133-162 — Three error branches (forbidden|401|403, not found|404, token|unauthorized) overlap. A 403 response with body "unauthorized token" would match the forbidden branch first (correct) but tests don't cover the priority. Document priority.
• LOW src/commands/agents-platform/agentsApi.ts:85-88 — 403 message hardcodes "Pro/Max/Team" — diverges from upstream subscription tiers; LOW since string.
• PASS — autofix-pr covers session_create_failed, repo_mismatch, teleport_failed, registration_failed, rc_already_monitoring_other, exception — comprehensive.
• MEDIUM src/commands/issue/index.ts:459-477 — gh issue create failure surfaces full stderr to user; if gh embeds the title (which can contain user-supplied content) into error message, no info leak per se but msg.slice(0, 200) is logged to analytics — confirm analytics field is not PII-tagged.

G. Production risk

• HIGH src/commands/perf-issue/index.ts:13-19 — COST_RATES hardcoded to Claude 3.7 Sonnet rates. As of 2026-04-29 with Sonnet 4.6 and Opus 4.5 in use, the cost estimate is wrong. Fix: read from a constants file or remove cost estimate altogether.
• HIGH src/commands/perf-issue/index.ts:128-148 — Tool durations use Date.now() AT PARSE TIME (when /perf-issue is run), not log timestamp. Every tool will have durationMs ≈ same value (the time between consecutive parse iterations, microseconds). The output is meaningless. Fix: read entry.timestamp for both tool_use and tool_result and subtract; or remove the tool-duration table.
• MEDIUM src/services/api/claude.ts:1455 + break-cache/index.ts — Nonce is randomUUID() (128 bits crypto-random), correctly cache-busts since the <!-- cache-break nonce: X --> line forces prefix-hash differ. PASS.
• MEDIUM src/commands/agents-platform/agentsApi.ts:141 — Hardcoded timezone: 'UTC' despite AgentTrigger.timezone being a field. User cron expressions interpreted in UTC regardless of locale → silent surprise for users in non-UTC TZ. Fix: accept --tz flag or use Intl.DateTimeFormat().resolvedOptions().timeZone.
• MEDIUM src/commands/perf-issue/index.ts:374 — Filename uses new Date().toISOString().replace(/[:.]/g,'-') — UTC-based, but local users may expect local time. Document or use local TZ.
• LOW src/commands/share/index.ts:340 — mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'cc-share-')) plus immediate write to claude-session.jsonl: tmp file may persist if process is SIGKILLed mid-upload (rmSync in finally won't run). Acceptable for share; note it.

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OVERALL-VERDICT: NEEDS_FIX

• CRITICAL: 0
• HIGH: 5 (break-cache atomicity, ctx_viz max-tokens, issue body cap, perf cost rates stale, perf tool durations meaningless)
• MEDIUM: 13
• LOW: 5

Top three to fix before merge: (1) perf-issue tool-duration timestamps (G), (2) break-cache stats RMW atomicity (C), (3) issue browser-fallback body length cap (E).