mirror of
https://github.com/claude-code-best/claude-code.git
synced 2026-06-18 06:15:51 +00:00
* fix: harden ACP communication boundaries Harden ACP communication boundaries Remote ACP sessions now cannot widen permission mode through untrusted metadata or client payloads. WebSocket ACP ingress measures payloads by bytes before binary decode, and prompt queue handoff keeps exactly one prompt active while queued prompts are drained FIFO. Constraint: ACP remote clients must not be able to open bypassPermissions without local launch intent Constraint: WebSocket payload limits must be byte-based and checked before binary decode Rejected: Keep promptToQueryContent wrapper | no production consumers remained after prompt conversion single-sourcing Confidence: high Scope-risk: moderate Directive: Do not re-enable remote bypassPermissions from _meta unless a local launch gate is verified in both acp-link and agent Tested: targeted ACP/RCS/acp-link prompt queue, bridge, permission, payload, and prompt conversion tests; bun run typecheck; bun run build Not-tested: Manual live ACP/RCS session against an external client * fix: restore repository verification gates Keep the full repository test, typecheck, build, and Biome lint gates usable after the ACP fix pass. This commit is intentionally separate from the ACP behavior change: it fixes Windows-safe Langfuse home redaction, removes stale lint suppressions, resolves Biome warning/info diagnostics, and keeps env expansion tests explicit without template-placeholder lint noise. Constraint: The project completion contract requires full typecheck, lint, test, and build evidence Rejected: Leave warning/info diagnostics as historical noise | they obscure future gate regressions and weaken flow-impact claims Confidence: high Scope-risk: narrow Directive: Keep repository gate cleanup separate from feature fixes when it is not part of the same runtime path Tested: bunx biome lint src/; bunx tsc --noEmit; bun test src/services/mcp/__tests__/envExpansion.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/sliceAnsi.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/stringUtils.test.ts; bun test; bun run build Not-tested: Manual Langfuse export against a real external Langfuse service * fix: harden ACP failure boundaries after review Deep review found several paths that made ACP communication failures look normal: prompt errors could finish as end_turn, permission pipeline exceptions could fall through to client approval, tool rawInput was deep-copied with JSON, and acp-link accepted unbounded or unvalidated WebSocket payloads. This keeps the behavior fail-closed, validates WS payloads before dispatch, caps payload size before JSON parse, and preserves cancellation intent with a generation counter. Constraint: User explicitly rejected pseudo-fixes, fallback behavior, and unbounded payload handling Rejected: Keep JSON stringify/parse rawInput copy | duplicates large payloads and silently drops non-JSON inputs Rejected: Delegate permission pipeline errors to client approval | allows a broken local permission check to be bypassed Confidence: high Scope-risk: moderate Directive: Do not convert ACP errors into normal end_turn responses without a protocol-level reason and regression tests Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit Tested: bunx biome lint src/ packages/acp-link/src/ Tested: bun run test:all Tested: bun run build Not-tested: Manual end-to-end ACP client session over a real editor WebSocket * fix: prevent ACP coverage runs from seeing partial mocks GitHub Actions failed under bun test --coverage because permissions.test.ts replaced ../bridge.js with a partial mock that omitted forwardSessionUpdates. Coverage worker ordering on Linux let sibling tests observe that incomplete module. This isolates ACP test mocks by snapshotting real exports, overriding only requested symbols, and restoring mocks in LIFO order. The shared helper also keeps the same behavior in agent.test.ts without duplicating mock infrastructure. Constraint: bun:test mock.module is process-global inside a worker. Rejected: Add fallback exports or production guards | the bridge export exists; the failure was test mock pollution. Rejected: Keep per-file helper copies | duplication would let restore semantics drift again. Confidence: high Scope-risk: narrow Directive: Prefer safeMockModule for partial mocks of real modules in ACP tests; plain mock.module is only appropriate for fully synthetic modules or isolated tests. Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit Tested: bun run lint Tested: git diff --check Not-tested: Linux runner directly before push * fix: normalize ACP bypass requests without warning noise The previous CI repair removed the failing partial bridge mock, but it also added a shared safeMockModule helper and left the acp-link bypass normalization warning in the real new_session path. This tightens the fix: acp-link now treats an unauthorized client bypass request as normal permission-mode normalization without emitting a warning, and the ACP permission test explicitly preserves the real bridge and permission exports instead of using a shared helper. The agent test keeps its local mock preservation but names it by behavior and restores mocks in LIFO order. Constraint: CI output should not contain expected warning noise for covered policy branches. Rejected: Silence the test only | the normal new_session path would still warn for an expected normalization branch. Rejected: Keep the shared safeMockModule helper | the failing module was specific and should be fixed by preserving real exports at the mocking site. Confidence: high Scope-risk: narrow Directive: Treat client-requested bypassPermissions as data to normalize unless the local default explicitly enables bypass. Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov with UPPER_WARN_COUNT=0 Tested: bun run test:all Tested: bun run lint Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit Tested: git diff --check * fix: harden ACP bypass and CI warning gates ACP clients must not be able to enter bypassPermissions unless the local ACP gate and process environment both allow it. The same gate now controls session creation, explicit mode changes, and the ExitPlanMode option list, while session setup restores process.cwd so coverage and later work do not inherit ACP session state. Constraint: CI must stay warning-clean without hiding real ACP permission failures Rejected: Logging rejected bypass requests on the normal new_session path | it preserves audit text but reintroduces warning noise the runtime should not emit Rejected: Broad CI=true postinstall skip | it hides explicit Chrome MCP setup checks outside the install path Confidence: high Scope-risk: moderate Directive: Keep bypassPermissions gated through one ACP availability decision before exposing it to clients Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts Tested: bun run test:all Tested: bun run lint Tested: bun run build:vite with zero warning matches Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter lcov --coverage-dir coverage produced non-empty lcov with SF records and zero filtered warning matches Not-tested: GitHub Actions result after this push * fix: remove remaining CI warning noise The CI log still had three non-failing warnings after the ACP hardening commit: git init default-branch advice from checkout, a Node 20 action-runtime deprecation, and one additional known Vite dynamic-import diagnostic that only surfaced on Linux. The workflow now provides explicit git config and opts actions into Node 24, while Vite keeps a narrow allowlist for acknowledged optimizer diagnostics. Constraint: Do not use shell log filtering to hide warnings after they happen Rejected: Grep warning lines out of CI output | it would make future diagnostics harder to find Confidence: high Scope-risk: narrow Directive: Add new Vite warning allowlist entries only after checking that they are existing optimizer diagnostics, not new application defects Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false Tested: bunx biome lint .github/workflows/ci.yml vite.config.ts Tested: bun run build:vite with zero warning matches Not-tested: GitHub Actions result after this push * fix: reject unauthorized ACP bypass and harden CI actions ACP clients now fail closed when permissionMode is malformed, unknown, or requests bypass without a local bypass opt-in. acp-link validates new_session input before forwarding to the agent and returns client error frames for expected unauthorized requests without logging create-failed noise. The direct AcpAgent path independently rejects invalid _meta.permissionMode and unauthorized bypass instead of falling back to settings. CI workflows and generated GitHub App templates now use Node 24-compatible actions pinned to immutable commit SHAs, and acp-link startup output no longer prints the auth token. Constraint: Must not hide warnings with test isolation or log filtering Rejected: Silent fallback to local permission mode | accepts invalid client intent and masks boundary behavior Rejected: Broad dependency churn from bun update | audit remained failing while package and lockfile churn expanded scope Confidence: high Scope-risk: moderate Directive: Client-provided permissionMode must stay fail-closed before reaching AcpAgent; only local settings.defaultMode may fall back to default on invalid local config Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts src/services/skillLearning/__tests__/skillLifecycle.test.ts src/utils/settings/__tests__/config.test.ts Tested: bunx tsc -p packages/acp-link/tsconfig.json --noEmit --pretty false Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false Tested: bun run lint Tested: bun run test:all Tested: local CI equivalent install/typecheck/coverage/build with warning_scan=0 Not-tested: Pre-existing bun audit vulnerabilities require a separate dependency-hardening PR * fix: resolve dependency audit findings precisely Use dependency-native upgrades and lockfile resolution to close the audit findings without suppressions. Keep the chrome MCP setup aligned with the new dependency graph and add real integration coverage so the override behavior stays verified. Constraint: no audit ignores or warning suppression Rejected: broad google-auth/protobuf overrides | replaced with upstream-compatible resolution Confidence: high Scope-risk: moderate Directive: keep dependency fixes upstream-compatible; do not reintroduce blanket overrides unless the audit surface changes materially Tested: bun audit; bun audit --json; bun install --frozen-lockfile with CLAUDE_CODE_SKIP_CHROME_MCP_SETUP=1; bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false; bun run lint; targeted tests; bun run test:all; bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter lcov --coverage-dir coverage; bun run build:vite Not-tested: unrelated pre-existing ACP/CORS/token fallback residual risks * fix: keep ACP auth tokens out of URLs Replace the ad hoc URL-token flow with crypto UUID-backed transport identifiers so the bearer token stays in structured request data instead of query strings. Keep the server, web client, and transport helpers aligned so the ACP/RCS handshake remains compatible after the API shape change. Constraint: token must not be embedded in the URL Rejected: token-as-uuid query fallback | leaked bearer tokens in URLs Confidence: high Scope-risk: moderate Directive: preserve the structured auth path; do not reintroduce query-token fallback when adjusting ACP transport code Tested: targeted ACP/RCS transport tests Not-tested: unrelated pre-existing ACP/CORS/token fallback residual risks * fix: normalize WebFetch request headers Normalize WebFetch headers before dispatch so canonicalization preserves auth semantics and duplicate forms do not slip through. Keep the behavior locked with a focused header test instead of broadening the request pipeline. Constraint: preserve header semantics without widening the fetch surface Rejected: ad hoc caller-side normalization | too easy to bypass in future call sites Confidence: high Scope-risk: narrow Directive: keep header normalization close to the WebFetch utility so future callers inherit the same behavior automatically Tested: targeted WebFetch header tests Not-tested: unrelated fetch backend behavior beyond header normalization * fix: harden ACP remote auth surfaces Tighten the remaining Claude security artifact items by requiring API keys on ACP global reads and relay upgrades, moving WebSocket tokens out of URLs, and replacing open web CORS with an explicit allowlist. Constraint: Browser WebSocket clients cannot set arbitrary Authorization headers, so the token is carried in a selected subprotocol instead of a query string. Rejected: Keep UUID auth for ACP channel groups | any caller can mint a UUID and read global ACP data. Rejected: Preserve ?token= compatibility | secrets leak into logs, history, referrers, and intermediaries. Confidence: high Scope-risk: moderate Directive: Do not reintroduce query-string bearer tokens; use Authorization or rcs.auth.<base64url-token>. Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false Tested: bun run typecheck in packages/remote-control-server Tested: bun run build in packages/acp-link Tested: bun run lint Tested: bun audit Tested: focused RCS/acp-link/web tests, 160 pass Tested: Edge headless browser WebSocket subprotocol handshake Tested: bun run test:all, 3669 pass Tested: bun run build:vite Tested: bun run build Not-tested: Manual end-to-end relay with a live external ACP agent * fix: resolve CI dependency override lookup The CI runner does not expose @grpc/proto-loader as a root-resolvable package, and the test was relying on local hoisting rather than the real dependency owner. Resolve proto-loader through @opentelemetry/exporter-trace-otlp-grpc and @grpc/grpc-js so the smoke test follows the package graph it is validating. Constraint: Do not add a new root dependency for a transitive smoke test. Rejected: Skip or weaken the test | the test protects the protobuf 7 override path and should keep exercising loadSync. Rejected: Add @grpc/proto-loader directly to root package.json | that hides the owning-package resolution issue and broadens dependency surface. Confidence: high Scope-risk: narrow Directive: Dependency override smoke tests should resolve from the package that actually owns the dependency, not from incidental root hoisting. Tested: bun test tests/integration/dependency-overrides.test.ts; bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false; bun run lint; bun audit; bun run test:all; git diff --check --------- Co-authored-by: unraid <local@unraid.local>
735 lines
24 KiB
TypeScript
735 lines
24 KiB
TypeScript
import axios, { type AxiosError } from 'axios'
|
|
import type { StdoutMessage } from 'src/entrypoints/sdk/controlTypes.js'
|
|
import { logForDebugging } from '../../utils/debug.js'
|
|
import { rcLog } from '../../bridge/rcDebugLog.js'
|
|
import { logForDiagnosticsNoPII } from '../../utils/diagLogs.js'
|
|
import { errorMessage } from '../../utils/errors.js'
|
|
import { getSessionIngressAuthHeaders } from '../../utils/sessionIngressAuth.js'
|
|
import { sleep } from '../../utils/sleep.js'
|
|
import { jsonParse, jsonStringify } from '../../utils/slowOperations.js'
|
|
import { getClaudeCodeUserAgent } from '../../utils/userAgent.js'
|
|
import type { Transport } from './Transport.js'
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Configuration
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
const RECONNECT_BASE_DELAY_MS = 1000
|
|
const RECONNECT_MAX_DELAY_MS = 30_000
|
|
/** Time budget for reconnection attempts before giving up (10 minutes). */
|
|
const RECONNECT_GIVE_UP_MS = 600_000
|
|
/** Server sends keepalives every 15s; treat connection as dead after 45s of silence. */
|
|
const LIVENESS_TIMEOUT_MS = 45_000
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* HTTP status codes that indicate a permanent server-side rejection.
|
|
* The transport transitions to 'closed' immediately without retrying.
|
|
*/
|
|
const PERMANENT_HTTP_CODES = new Set([401, 403, 404])
|
|
|
|
// POST retry configuration (matches HybridTransport)
|
|
const POST_MAX_RETRIES = 10
|
|
const POST_BASE_DELAY_MS = 500
|
|
const POST_MAX_DELAY_MS = 8000
|
|
|
|
/** Hoisted TextDecoder options to avoid per-chunk allocation in readStream. */
|
|
const STREAM_DECODE_OPTS: TextDecodeOptions = { stream: true }
|
|
|
|
/** Hoisted axios validateStatus callback to avoid per-request closure allocation. */
|
|
function alwaysValidStatus(): boolean {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// SSE Frame Parser
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
type SSEFrame = {
|
|
event?: string
|
|
id?: string
|
|
data?: string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Incrementally parse SSE frames from a text buffer.
|
|
* Returns parsed frames and the remaining (incomplete) buffer.
|
|
*
|
|
* @internal exported for testing
|
|
*/
|
|
export function parseSSEFrames(buffer: string): {
|
|
frames: SSEFrame[]
|
|
remaining: string
|
|
} {
|
|
const frames: SSEFrame[] = []
|
|
let pos = 0
|
|
|
|
// SSE frames are delimited by an empty line. Support LF and CRLF streams.
|
|
const frameDelimiter = /\r?\n\r?\n/g
|
|
frameDelimiter.lastIndex = pos
|
|
|
|
let delimiterMatch: RegExpExecArray | null
|
|
while ((delimiterMatch = frameDelimiter.exec(buffer)) !== null) {
|
|
const frameEnd = delimiterMatch.index
|
|
const rawFrame = buffer.slice(pos, frameEnd)
|
|
pos = frameEnd + delimiterMatch[0].length
|
|
|
|
// Skip empty frames
|
|
if (!rawFrame.trim()) continue
|
|
|
|
const frame: SSEFrame = {}
|
|
let isComment = false
|
|
|
|
for (const rawLine of rawFrame.split('\n')) {
|
|
// Normalize CRLF lines in mixed-line-ending streams.
|
|
const line =
|
|
rawLine[rawLine.length - 1] === '\r'
|
|
? rawLine.slice(0, -1)
|
|
: rawLine
|
|
|
|
if (line.startsWith(':')) {
|
|
// SSE comment (e.g., `:keepalive`)
|
|
isComment = true
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const colonIdx = line.indexOf(':')
|
|
if (colonIdx === -1) continue
|
|
|
|
const field = line.slice(0, colonIdx)
|
|
// Per SSE spec, strip one leading space after colon if present
|
|
const value =
|
|
line[colonIdx + 1] === ' '
|
|
? line.slice(colonIdx + 2)
|
|
: line.slice(colonIdx + 1)
|
|
|
|
switch (field) {
|
|
case 'event':
|
|
frame.event = value
|
|
break
|
|
case 'id':
|
|
frame.id = value
|
|
break
|
|
case 'data':
|
|
// Per SSE spec, multiple data: lines are concatenated with \n
|
|
frame.data = frame.data ? frame.data + '\n' + value : value
|
|
break
|
|
// Ignore other fields (retry:, etc.)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Only emit frames that have data (or are pure comments which reset liveness)
|
|
if (frame.data || isComment) {
|
|
frames.push(frame)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return { frames, remaining: buffer.slice(pos) }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Types
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
type SSETransportState =
|
|
| 'idle'
|
|
| 'connected'
|
|
| 'reconnecting'
|
|
| 'closing'
|
|
| 'closed'
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Payload for `event: client_event` frames, matching the StreamClientEvent
|
|
* proto message in session_stream.proto. This is the only event type sent
|
|
* to worker subscribers — delivery_update, session_update, ephemeral_event,
|
|
* and catch_up_truncated are client-channel-only (see notifier.go and
|
|
* event_stream.go SubscriberClient guard).
|
|
*/
|
|
export type StreamClientEvent = {
|
|
event_id: string
|
|
sequence_num: number
|
|
event_type: string
|
|
source: string
|
|
payload: Record<string, unknown>
|
|
created_at: string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// SSETransport
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Transport that uses SSE for reading and HTTP POST for writing.
|
|
*
|
|
* Reads events via Server-Sent Events from the CCR v2 event stream endpoint.
|
|
* Writes events via HTTP POST with retry logic (same pattern as HybridTransport).
|
|
*
|
|
* Each `event: client_event` frame carries a StreamClientEvent proto JSON
|
|
* directly in `data:`. The transport extracts `payload` and passes it to
|
|
* `onData` as newline-delimited JSON for StructuredIO consumers.
|
|
*
|
|
* Supports automatic reconnection with exponential backoff and Last-Event-ID
|
|
* for resumption after disconnection.
|
|
*/
|
|
export class SSETransport implements Transport {
|
|
private state: SSETransportState = 'idle'
|
|
private onData?: (data: string) => void
|
|
private onCloseCallback?: (closeCode?: number) => void
|
|
private onEventCallback?: (event: StreamClientEvent) => void
|
|
private headers: Record<string, string>
|
|
private sessionId?: string
|
|
private refreshHeaders?: () => Record<string, string>
|
|
private readonly getAuthHeaders: () => Record<string, string>
|
|
|
|
// SSE connection state
|
|
private abortController: AbortController | null = null
|
|
private lastSequenceNum = 0
|
|
private seenSequenceNums = new Set<number>()
|
|
|
|
// Reconnection state
|
|
private reconnectAttempts = 0
|
|
private reconnectStartTime: number | null = null
|
|
private reconnectTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null
|
|
|
|
// Liveness detection
|
|
private livenessTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null
|
|
private lastActivityTime = 0
|
|
|
|
// POST URL (derived from SSE URL)
|
|
private postUrl: string
|
|
|
|
// Runtime epoch for CCR v2 event format
|
|
|
|
constructor(
|
|
private readonly url: URL,
|
|
headers: Record<string, string> = {},
|
|
sessionId?: string,
|
|
refreshHeaders?: () => Record<string, string>,
|
|
initialSequenceNum?: number,
|
|
/**
|
|
* Per-instance auth header source. Omit to read the process-wide
|
|
* CLAUDE_CODE_SESSION_ACCESS_TOKEN (single-session callers). Required
|
|
* for concurrent multi-session callers — the env-var path is a process
|
|
* global and would stomp across sessions.
|
|
*/
|
|
getAuthHeaders?: () => Record<string, string>,
|
|
) {
|
|
this.headers = headers
|
|
this.sessionId = sessionId
|
|
this.refreshHeaders = refreshHeaders
|
|
this.getAuthHeaders = getAuthHeaders ?? getSessionIngressAuthHeaders
|
|
this.postUrl = convertSSEUrlToPostUrl(url)
|
|
// Seed with a caller-provided high-water mark so the first connect()
|
|
// sends from_sequence_num / Last-Event-ID. Without this, a fresh
|
|
// SSETransport always asks the server to replay from sequence 0 —
|
|
// the entire session history on every transport swap.
|
|
if (initialSequenceNum !== undefined && initialSequenceNum > 0) {
|
|
this.lastSequenceNum = initialSequenceNum
|
|
}
|
|
logForDebugging(`SSETransport: SSE URL = ${url.href}`)
|
|
logForDebugging(`SSETransport: POST URL = ${this.postUrl}`)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('info', 'cli_sse_transport_initialized')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* High-water mark of sequence numbers seen on this stream. Callers that
|
|
* recreate the transport (e.g. replBridge onWorkReceived) read this before
|
|
* close() and pass it as `initialSequenceNum` to the next instance so the
|
|
* server resumes from the right point instead of replaying everything.
|
|
*/
|
|
getLastSequenceNum(): number {
|
|
return this.lastSequenceNum
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async connect(): Promise<void> {
|
|
if (this.state !== 'idle' && this.state !== 'reconnecting') {
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: Cannot connect, current state is ${this.state}`,
|
|
{ level: 'error' },
|
|
)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('error', 'cli_sse_connect_failed')
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
this.state = 'reconnecting'
|
|
const connectStartTime = Date.now()
|
|
|
|
// Build SSE URL with sequence number for resumption
|
|
const sseUrl = new URL(this.url.href)
|
|
if (this.lastSequenceNum > 0) {
|
|
sseUrl.searchParams.set('from_sequence_num', String(this.lastSequenceNum))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Build headers -- use fresh auth headers (supports Cookie for session keys).
|
|
// Remove stale Authorization header from this.headers when Cookie auth is used,
|
|
// since sending both confuses the auth interceptor.
|
|
const authHeaders = this.getAuthHeaders()
|
|
const headers: Record<string, string> = {
|
|
...this.headers,
|
|
...authHeaders,
|
|
Accept: 'text/event-stream',
|
|
'anthropic-version': '2023-06-01',
|
|
'User-Agent': getClaudeCodeUserAgent(),
|
|
}
|
|
if (authHeaders['Cookie']) {
|
|
delete headers['Authorization']
|
|
}
|
|
if (this.lastSequenceNum > 0) {
|
|
headers['Last-Event-ID'] = String(this.lastSequenceNum)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
logForDebugging(`SSETransport: Opening ${sseUrl.href}`)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('info', 'cli_sse_connect_opening')
|
|
|
|
this.abortController = new AbortController()
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line eslint-plugin-n/no-unsupported-features/node-builtins
|
|
const response = await fetch(sseUrl.href, {
|
|
headers,
|
|
signal: this.abortController.signal,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
if (!response.ok) {
|
|
const isPermanent = PERMANENT_HTTP_CODES.has(response.status)
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: HTTP ${response.status}${isPermanent ? ' (permanent)' : ''}`,
|
|
{ level: 'error' },
|
|
)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('error', 'cli_sse_connect_http_error', {
|
|
status: response.status,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
if (isPermanent) {
|
|
this.state = 'closed'
|
|
this.onCloseCallback?.(response.status)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
this.handleConnectionError()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!response.body) {
|
|
logForDebugging('SSETransport: No response body')
|
|
this.handleConnectionError()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Successfully connected
|
|
const connectDuration = Date.now() - connectStartTime
|
|
logForDebugging('SSETransport: Connected')
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('info', 'cli_sse_connect_connected', {
|
|
duration_ms: connectDuration,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
this.state = 'connected'
|
|
this.reconnectAttempts = 0
|
|
this.reconnectStartTime = null
|
|
this.resetLivenessTimer()
|
|
|
|
// Read the SSE stream
|
|
await this.readStream(response.body)
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (this.abortController?.signal.aborted) {
|
|
// Intentional close
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: Connection error: ${errorMessage(error)}`,
|
|
{ level: 'error' },
|
|
)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('error', 'cli_sse_connect_error')
|
|
this.handleConnectionError()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Read and process the SSE stream body.
|
|
*/
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line eslint-plugin-n/no-unsupported-features/node-builtins
|
|
private async readStream(body: ReadableStream<Uint8Array>): Promise<void> {
|
|
const reader = body.getReader()
|
|
const decoder = new TextDecoder()
|
|
let buffer = ''
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
const { done, value } = await reader.read()
|
|
if (done) break
|
|
|
|
buffer += decoder.decode(value, STREAM_DECODE_OPTS)
|
|
const { frames, remaining } = parseSSEFrames(buffer)
|
|
buffer = remaining
|
|
|
|
for (const frame of frames) {
|
|
// Any frame (including keepalive comments) proves the connection is alive
|
|
this.resetLivenessTimer()
|
|
|
|
if (frame.id) {
|
|
const seqNum = parseInt(frame.id, 10)
|
|
if (!isNaN(seqNum)) {
|
|
if (this.seenSequenceNums.has(seqNum)) {
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: DUPLICATE frame seq=${seqNum} (lastSequenceNum=${this.lastSequenceNum}, seenCount=${this.seenSequenceNums.size})`,
|
|
{ level: 'warn' },
|
|
)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('warn', 'cli_sse_duplicate_sequence')
|
|
} else {
|
|
this.seenSequenceNums.add(seqNum)
|
|
// Prevent unbounded growth: once we have many entries, prune
|
|
// old sequence numbers that are well below the high-water mark.
|
|
// Only sequence numbers near lastSequenceNum matter for dedup.
|
|
if (this.seenSequenceNums.size > 1000) {
|
|
const threshold = this.lastSequenceNum - 200
|
|
for (const s of this.seenSequenceNums) {
|
|
if (s < threshold) {
|
|
this.seenSequenceNums.delete(s)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (seqNum > this.lastSequenceNum) {
|
|
this.lastSequenceNum = seqNum
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (frame.event && frame.data) {
|
|
this.handleSSEFrame(frame.event, frame.data)
|
|
} else if (frame.data) {
|
|
// data: without event: — server is emitting the old envelope format
|
|
// or a bug. Log so incidents show as a signal instead of silent drops.
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
'SSETransport: Frame has data: but no event: field — dropped',
|
|
{ level: 'warn' },
|
|
)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('warn', 'cli_sse_frame_missing_event_field')
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (this.abortController?.signal.aborted) return
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: Stream read error: ${errorMessage(error)}`,
|
|
{ level: 'error' },
|
|
)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('error', 'cli_sse_stream_read_error')
|
|
} finally {
|
|
reader.releaseLock()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Stream ended — reconnect unless we're closing
|
|
if (this.state !== 'closing' && this.state !== 'closed') {
|
|
logForDebugging('SSETransport: Stream ended, reconnecting')
|
|
this.handleConnectionError()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Handle a single SSE frame. The event: field names the variant; data:
|
|
* carries the inner proto JSON directly (no envelope).
|
|
*
|
|
* Worker subscribers only receive client_event frames (see notifier.go) —
|
|
* any other event type indicates a server-side change that CC doesn't yet
|
|
* understand. Log a diagnostic so we notice in telemetry.
|
|
*/
|
|
private handleSSEFrame(eventType: string, data: string): void {
|
|
if (eventType !== 'client_event') {
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: Unexpected SSE event type '${eventType}' on worker stream`,
|
|
{ level: 'warn' },
|
|
)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('warn', 'cli_sse_unexpected_event_type', {
|
|
event_type: eventType,
|
|
})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let ev: StreamClientEvent
|
|
try {
|
|
ev = jsonParse(data) as StreamClientEvent
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: Failed to parse client_event data: ${errorMessage(error)}`,
|
|
{ level: 'error' },
|
|
)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const payload = ev.payload
|
|
if (payload && typeof payload === 'object' && 'type' in payload) {
|
|
const sessionLabel = this.sessionId ? ` session=${this.sessionId}` : ''
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: Event seq=${ev.sequence_num} event_id=${ev.event_id} event_type=${ev.event_type} payload_type=${String(payload.type)}${sessionLabel}`,
|
|
)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('info', 'cli_sse_message_received')
|
|
// Pass the unwrapped payload as newline-delimited JSON,
|
|
// matching the format that StructuredIO/WebSocketTransport consumers expect
|
|
this.onData?.(jsonStringify(payload) + '\n')
|
|
} else {
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: Ignoring client_event with no type in payload: event_id=${ev.event_id}`,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
this.onEventCallback?.(ev)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Handle connection errors with exponential backoff and time budget.
|
|
*/
|
|
private handleConnectionError(): void {
|
|
rcLog(
|
|
`SSE handleConnectionError: state=${this.state}` +
|
|
` lastSeqNum=${this.getLastSequenceNum()}` +
|
|
` reconnectAttempts=${this.reconnectAttempts}` +
|
|
` msSinceLastActivity=${this.lastActivityTime > 0 ? Date.now() - this.lastActivityTime : -1}`,
|
|
)
|
|
this.clearLivenessTimer()
|
|
|
|
if (this.state === 'closing' || this.state === 'closed') return
|
|
|
|
// Abort any in-flight SSE fetch
|
|
this.abortController?.abort()
|
|
this.abortController = null
|
|
|
|
const now = Date.now()
|
|
if (!this.reconnectStartTime) {
|
|
this.reconnectStartTime = now
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const elapsed = now - this.reconnectStartTime
|
|
if (elapsed < RECONNECT_GIVE_UP_MS) {
|
|
// Clear any existing timer
|
|
if (this.reconnectTimer) {
|
|
clearTimeout(this.reconnectTimer)
|
|
this.reconnectTimer = null
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Refresh headers before reconnecting
|
|
if (this.refreshHeaders) {
|
|
const freshHeaders = this.refreshHeaders()
|
|
Object.assign(this.headers, freshHeaders)
|
|
logForDebugging('SSETransport: Refreshed headers for reconnect')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
this.state = 'reconnecting'
|
|
this.reconnectAttempts++
|
|
|
|
const baseDelay = Math.min(
|
|
RECONNECT_BASE_DELAY_MS * 2 ** (this.reconnectAttempts - 1),
|
|
RECONNECT_MAX_DELAY_MS,
|
|
)
|
|
// Add ±25% jitter
|
|
const delay = Math.max(
|
|
0,
|
|
baseDelay + baseDelay * 0.25 * (2 * Math.random() - 1),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: Reconnecting in ${Math.round(delay)}ms (attempt ${this.reconnectAttempts}, ${Math.round(elapsed / 1000)}s elapsed)`,
|
|
)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('error', 'cli_sse_reconnect_attempt', {
|
|
reconnectAttempts: this.reconnectAttempts,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
this.reconnectTimer = setTimeout(() => {
|
|
this.reconnectTimer = null
|
|
void this.connect()
|
|
}, delay)
|
|
} else {
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: Reconnection time budget exhausted after ${Math.round(elapsed / 1000)}s`,
|
|
{ level: 'error' },
|
|
)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('error', 'cli_sse_reconnect_exhausted', {
|
|
reconnectAttempts: this.reconnectAttempts,
|
|
elapsedMs: elapsed,
|
|
})
|
|
this.state = 'closed'
|
|
this.onCloseCallback?.()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Bound timeout callback. Hoisted from an inline closure so that
|
|
* resetLivenessTimer (called per-frame) does not allocate a new closure
|
|
* on every SSE frame.
|
|
*/
|
|
private readonly onLivenessTimeout = (): void => {
|
|
this.livenessTimer = null
|
|
rcLog(
|
|
`SSE liveness timeout (${LIVENESS_TIMEOUT_MS}ms)` +
|
|
` lastSeqNum=${this.getLastSequenceNum()}` +
|
|
` state=${this.state}`,
|
|
)
|
|
logForDebugging('SSETransport: Liveness timeout, reconnecting', {
|
|
level: 'error',
|
|
})
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('error', 'cli_sse_liveness_timeout')
|
|
this.abortController?.abort()
|
|
this.handleConnectionError()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Reset the liveness timer. If no SSE frame arrives within the timeout,
|
|
* treat the connection as dead and reconnect.
|
|
*/
|
|
private resetLivenessTimer(): void {
|
|
this.clearLivenessTimer()
|
|
this.livenessTimer = setTimeout(this.onLivenessTimeout, LIVENESS_TIMEOUT_MS)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private clearLivenessTimer(): void {
|
|
if (this.livenessTimer) {
|
|
clearTimeout(this.livenessTimer)
|
|
this.livenessTimer = null
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Write (HTTP POST) — same pattern as HybridTransport
|
|
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
async write(message: StdoutMessage): Promise<void> {
|
|
const authHeaders = this.getAuthHeaders()
|
|
if (Object.keys(authHeaders).length === 0) {
|
|
logForDebugging('SSETransport: No session token available for POST')
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('warn', 'cli_sse_post_no_token')
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const headers: Record<string, string> = {
|
|
...authHeaders,
|
|
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
|
|
'anthropic-version': '2023-06-01',
|
|
'User-Agent': getClaudeCodeUserAgent(),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: POST body keys=${Object.keys(message as Record<string, unknown>).join(',')}`,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= POST_MAX_RETRIES; attempt++) {
|
|
try {
|
|
const response = await axios.post(this.postUrl, message, {
|
|
headers,
|
|
validateStatus: alwaysValidStatus,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
if (response.status === 200 || response.status === 201) {
|
|
logForDebugging(`SSETransport: POST success type=${message.type}`)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: POST ${response.status} body=${jsonStringify(response.data).slice(0, 200)}`,
|
|
)
|
|
// 4xx errors (except 429) are permanent - don't retry
|
|
if (
|
|
response.status >= 400 &&
|
|
response.status < 500 &&
|
|
response.status !== 429
|
|
) {
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: POST returned ${response.status} (client error), not retrying`,
|
|
)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('warn', 'cli_sse_post_client_error', {
|
|
status: response.status,
|
|
})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 429 or 5xx - retry
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: POST returned ${response.status}, attempt ${attempt}/${POST_MAX_RETRIES}`,
|
|
)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('warn', 'cli_sse_post_retryable_error', {
|
|
status: response.status,
|
|
attempt,
|
|
})
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
const axiosError = error as AxiosError
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: POST error: ${axiosError.message}, attempt ${attempt}/${POST_MAX_RETRIES}`,
|
|
)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('warn', 'cli_sse_post_network_error', {
|
|
attempt,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (attempt === POST_MAX_RETRIES) {
|
|
logForDebugging(
|
|
`SSETransport: POST failed after ${POST_MAX_RETRIES} attempts, continuing`,
|
|
)
|
|
logForDiagnosticsNoPII('warn', 'cli_sse_post_retries_exhausted')
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const delayMs = Math.min(
|
|
POST_BASE_DELAY_MS * 2 ** (attempt - 1),
|
|
POST_MAX_DELAY_MS,
|
|
)
|
|
await sleep(delayMs)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Transport interface
|
|
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
isConnectedStatus(): boolean {
|
|
return this.state === 'connected'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
isClosedStatus(): boolean {
|
|
return this.state === 'closed'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
setOnData(callback: (data: string) => void): void {
|
|
this.onData = callback
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
setOnClose(callback: (closeCode?: number) => void): void {
|
|
this.onCloseCallback = callback
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
setOnEvent(callback: (event: StreamClientEvent) => void): void {
|
|
this.onEventCallback = callback
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
close(): void {
|
|
if (this.reconnectTimer) {
|
|
clearTimeout(this.reconnectTimer)
|
|
this.reconnectTimer = null
|
|
}
|
|
this.clearLivenessTimer()
|
|
|
|
this.state = 'closing'
|
|
this.abortController?.abort()
|
|
this.abortController = null
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// URL Conversion
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Convert an SSE URL to the HTTP POST endpoint URL.
|
|
* The SSE stream URL and POST URL share the same base; the POST endpoint
|
|
* is at `/events` (without `/stream`).
|
|
*
|
|
* From: https://api.example.com/v2/session_ingress/session/<session_id>/events/stream
|
|
* To: https://api.example.com/v2/session_ingress/session/<session_id>/events
|
|
*/
|
|
function convertSSEUrlToPostUrl(sseUrl: URL): string {
|
|
let pathname = sseUrl.pathname
|
|
// Remove /stream suffix to get the POST events endpoint
|
|
if (pathname.endsWith('/stream')) {
|
|
pathname = pathname.slice(0, -'/stream'.length)
|
|
}
|
|
return `${sseUrl.protocol}//${sseUrl.host}${pathname}`
|
|
}
|