Files
claude-code/packages/remote-control-server/web/src/lib/rcs-chat-adapter.ts
Dosion c2ac9a74c1 fix: resolve dependency audit findings precisely (#361)
* fix: harden ACP communication boundaries

Harden ACP communication boundaries

Remote ACP sessions now cannot widen permission mode through untrusted
metadata or client payloads. WebSocket ACP ingress measures payloads by bytes
before binary decode, and prompt queue handoff keeps exactly one prompt active
while queued prompts are drained FIFO.

Constraint: ACP remote clients must not be able to open bypassPermissions without local launch intent
Constraint: WebSocket payload limits must be byte-based and checked before binary decode
Rejected: Keep promptToQueryContent wrapper | no production consumers remained after prompt conversion single-sourcing
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Do not re-enable remote bypassPermissions from _meta unless a local launch gate is verified in both acp-link and agent
Tested: targeted ACP/RCS/acp-link prompt queue, bridge, permission, payload, and prompt conversion tests; bun run typecheck; bun run build
Not-tested: Manual live ACP/RCS session against an external client

* fix: restore repository verification gates

Keep the full repository test, typecheck, build, and Biome lint gates usable
after the ACP fix pass. This commit is intentionally separate from the ACP
behavior change: it fixes Windows-safe Langfuse home redaction, removes stale
lint suppressions, resolves Biome warning/info diagnostics, and keeps env
expansion tests explicit without template-placeholder lint noise.

Constraint: The project completion contract requires full typecheck, lint, test, and build evidence
Rejected: Leave warning/info diagnostics as historical noise | they obscure future gate regressions and weaken flow-impact claims
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep repository gate cleanup separate from feature fixes when it is not part of the same runtime path
Tested: bunx biome lint src/; bunx tsc --noEmit; bun test src/services/mcp/__tests__/envExpansion.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/sliceAnsi.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/stringUtils.test.ts; bun test; bun run build
Not-tested: Manual Langfuse export against a real external Langfuse service

* fix: harden ACP failure boundaries after review

Deep review found several paths that made ACP communication failures look normal: prompt errors could finish as end_turn, permission pipeline exceptions could fall through to client approval, tool rawInput was deep-copied with JSON, and acp-link accepted unbounded or unvalidated WebSocket payloads. This keeps the behavior fail-closed, validates WS payloads before dispatch, caps payload size before JSON parse, and preserves cancellation intent with a generation counter.

Constraint: User explicitly rejected pseudo-fixes, fallback behavior, and unbounded payload handling

Rejected: Keep JSON stringify/parse rawInput copy | duplicates large payloads and silently drops non-JSON inputs

Rejected: Delegate permission pipeline errors to client approval | allows a broken local permission check to be bypassed

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Directive: Do not convert ACP errors into normal end_turn responses without a protocol-level reason and regression tests

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts

Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit

Tested: bunx biome lint src/ packages/acp-link/src/

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: bun run build

Not-tested: Manual end-to-end ACP client session over a real editor WebSocket

* fix: prevent ACP coverage runs from seeing partial mocks

GitHub Actions failed under bun test --coverage because permissions.test.ts replaced ../bridge.js with a partial mock that omitted forwardSessionUpdates. Coverage worker ordering on Linux let sibling tests observe that incomplete module.

This isolates ACP test mocks by snapshotting real exports, overriding only requested symbols, and restoring mocks in LIFO order. The shared helper also keeps the same behavior in agent.test.ts without duplicating mock infrastructure.

Constraint: bun:test mock.module is process-global inside a worker.

Rejected: Add fallback exports or production guards | the bridge export exists; the failure was test mock pollution.

Rejected: Keep per-file helper copies | duplication would let restore semantics drift again.

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Prefer safeMockModule for partial mocks of real modules in ACP tests; plain mock.module is only appropriate for fully synthetic modules or isolated tests.

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts

Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: git diff --check

Not-tested: Linux runner directly before push

* fix: normalize ACP bypass requests without warning noise

The previous CI repair removed the failing partial bridge mock, but it also added a shared safeMockModule helper and left the acp-link bypass normalization warning in the real new_session path.

This tightens the fix: acp-link now treats an unauthorized client bypass request as normal permission-mode normalization without emitting a warning, and the ACP permission test explicitly preserves the real bridge and permission exports instead of using a shared helper. The agent test keeps its local mock preservation but names it by behavior and restores mocks in LIFO order.

Constraint: CI output should not contain expected warning noise for covered policy branches.

Rejected: Silence the test only | the normal new_session path would still warn for an expected normalization branch.

Rejected: Keep the shared safeMockModule helper | the failing module was specific and should be fixed by preserving real exports at the mocking site.

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Treat client-requested bypassPermissions as data to normalize unless the local default explicitly enables bypass.

Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts

Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov with UPPER_WARN_COUNT=0

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit

Tested: git diff --check

* fix: harden ACP bypass and CI warning gates

ACP clients must not be able to enter bypassPermissions unless the local ACP gate and process environment both allow it. The same gate now controls session creation, explicit mode changes, and the ExitPlanMode option list, while session setup restores process.cwd so coverage and later work do not inherit ACP session state.

Constraint: CI must stay warning-clean without hiding real ACP permission failures

Rejected: Logging rejected bypass requests on the normal new_session path | it preserves audit text but reintroduces warning noise the runtime should not emit

Rejected: Broad CI=true postinstall skip | it hides explicit Chrome MCP setup checks outside the install path

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Directive: Keep bypassPermissions gated through one ACP availability decision before exposing it to clients

Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: bun run build:vite with zero warning matches

Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter lcov --coverage-dir coverage produced non-empty lcov with SF records and zero filtered warning matches

Not-tested: GitHub Actions result after this push

* fix: remove remaining CI warning noise

The CI log still had three non-failing warnings after the ACP hardening commit: git init default-branch advice from checkout, a Node 20 action-runtime deprecation, and one additional known Vite dynamic-import diagnostic that only surfaced on Linux. The workflow now provides explicit git config and opts actions into Node 24, while Vite keeps a narrow allowlist for acknowledged optimizer diagnostics.

Constraint: Do not use shell log filtering to hide warnings after they happen

Rejected: Grep warning lines out of CI output | it would make future diagnostics harder to find

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Add new Vite warning allowlist entries only after checking that they are existing optimizer diagnostics, not new application defects

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false

Tested: bunx biome lint .github/workflows/ci.yml vite.config.ts

Tested: bun run build:vite with zero warning matches

Not-tested: GitHub Actions result after this push

* fix: reject unauthorized ACP bypass and harden CI actions

ACP clients now fail closed when permissionMode is malformed, unknown, or requests bypass without a local bypass opt-in. acp-link validates new_session input before forwarding to the agent and returns client error frames for expected unauthorized requests without logging create-failed noise. The direct AcpAgent path independently rejects invalid _meta.permissionMode and unauthorized bypass instead of falling back to settings.

CI workflows and generated GitHub App templates now use Node 24-compatible actions pinned to immutable commit SHAs, and acp-link startup output no longer prints the auth token.

Constraint: Must not hide warnings with test isolation or log filtering

Rejected: Silent fallback to local permission mode | accepts invalid client intent and masks boundary behavior

Rejected: Broad dependency churn from bun update | audit remained failing while package and lockfile churn expanded scope

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Directive: Client-provided permissionMode must stay fail-closed before reaching AcpAgent; only local settings.defaultMode may fall back to default on invalid local config

Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts src/services/skillLearning/__tests__/skillLifecycle.test.ts src/utils/settings/__tests__/config.test.ts

Tested: bunx tsc -p packages/acp-link/tsconfig.json --noEmit --pretty false

Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false

Tested: bun run lint

Tested: bun run test:all

Tested: local CI equivalent install/typecheck/coverage/build with warning_scan=0

Not-tested: Pre-existing bun audit vulnerabilities require a separate dependency-hardening PR

* fix: resolve dependency audit findings precisely

Use dependency-native upgrades and lockfile resolution to close the audit findings without suppressions. Keep the chrome MCP setup aligned with the new dependency graph and add real integration coverage so the override behavior stays verified.

Constraint: no audit ignores or warning suppression
Rejected: broad google-auth/protobuf overrides | replaced with upstream-compatible resolution
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: keep dependency fixes upstream-compatible; do not reintroduce blanket overrides unless the audit surface changes materially
Tested: bun audit; bun audit --json; bun install --frozen-lockfile with CLAUDE_CODE_SKIP_CHROME_MCP_SETUP=1; bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false; bun run lint; targeted tests; bun run test:all; bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter lcov --coverage-dir coverage; bun run build:vite
Not-tested: unrelated pre-existing ACP/CORS/token fallback residual risks

* fix: keep ACP auth tokens out of URLs

Replace the ad hoc URL-token flow with crypto UUID-backed transport identifiers so the bearer token stays in structured request data instead of query strings. Keep the server, web client, and transport helpers aligned so the ACP/RCS handshake remains compatible after the API shape change.

Constraint: token must not be embedded in the URL
Rejected: token-as-uuid query fallback | leaked bearer tokens in URLs
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: preserve the structured auth path; do not reintroduce query-token fallback when adjusting ACP transport code
Tested: targeted ACP/RCS transport tests
Not-tested: unrelated pre-existing ACP/CORS/token fallback residual risks

* fix: normalize WebFetch request headers

Normalize WebFetch headers before dispatch so canonicalization preserves auth semantics and duplicate forms do not slip through. Keep the behavior locked with a focused header test instead of broadening the request pipeline.

Constraint: preserve header semantics without widening the fetch surface
Rejected: ad hoc caller-side normalization | too easy to bypass in future call sites
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: keep header normalization close to the WebFetch utility so future callers inherit the same behavior automatically
Tested: targeted WebFetch header tests
Not-tested: unrelated fetch backend behavior beyond header normalization

* fix: harden ACP remote auth surfaces

Tighten the remaining Claude security artifact items by requiring API keys on ACP global reads and relay upgrades, moving WebSocket tokens out of URLs, and replacing open web CORS with an explicit allowlist.

Constraint: Browser WebSocket clients cannot set arbitrary Authorization headers, so the token is carried in a selected subprotocol instead of a query string.
Rejected: Keep UUID auth for ACP channel groups | any caller can mint a UUID and read global ACP data.
Rejected: Preserve ?token= compatibility | secrets leak into logs, history, referrers, and intermediaries.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Do not reintroduce query-string bearer tokens; use Authorization or rcs.auth.<base64url-token>.
Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false
Tested: bun run typecheck in packages/remote-control-server
Tested: bun run build in packages/acp-link
Tested: bun run lint
Tested: bun audit
Tested: focused RCS/acp-link/web tests, 160 pass
Tested: Edge headless browser WebSocket subprotocol handshake
Tested: bun run test:all, 3669 pass
Tested: bun run build:vite
Tested: bun run build
Not-tested: Manual end-to-end relay with a live external ACP agent

* fix: resolve CI dependency override lookup

The CI runner does not expose @grpc/proto-loader as a root-resolvable package, and the test was relying on local hoisting rather than the real dependency owner. Resolve proto-loader through @opentelemetry/exporter-trace-otlp-grpc and @grpc/grpc-js so the smoke test follows the package graph it is validating.

Constraint: Do not add a new root dependency for a transitive smoke test.

Rejected: Skip or weaken the test | the test protects the protobuf 7 override path and should keep exercising loadSync.

Rejected: Add @grpc/proto-loader directly to root package.json | that hides the owning-package resolution issue and broadens dependency surface.

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: narrow

Directive: Dependency override smoke tests should resolve from the package that actually owns the dependency, not from incidental root hoisting.

Tested: bun test tests/integration/dependency-overrides.test.ts; bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false; bun run lint; bun audit; bun run test:all; git diff --check

---------

Co-authored-by: unraid <local@unraid.local>
2026-04-26 19:49:54 +08:00

474 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
Raw Blame History

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import type { SetStateAction } from "react";
import {
apiFetchSession,
apiFetchSessionHistory,
apiBind,
apiSendEvent,
apiSendControl,
apiInterrupt,
getUuid,
} from "../api/client";
import { generateMessageUuid } from "./utils";
import type { SessionEvent, EventPayload } from "../types";
import type {
ThreadEntry,
ToolCallData,
ToolCallStatus,
UserMessageEntry,
AssistantMessageEntry,
ToolCallEntry,
UserMessageImage,
PendingPermission,
} from "./types";
// SSE Event Bus — 复用自 rcs-transport.ts仅保留连接管理
type SSEEventHandler = (event: SessionEvent) => void;
class SSEBus {
private listeners: Set<SSEEventHandler> = new Set();
private eventSource: EventSource | null = null;
onEvent(handler: SSEEventHandler): () => void {
this.listeners.add(handler);
return () => this.listeners.delete(handler);
}
connect(sessionId: string): void {
this.disconnect();
const uuid = getUuid();
const url = `/web/sessions/${sessionId}/events?uuid=${encodeURIComponent(uuid)}`;
const es = new EventSource(url);
this.eventSource = es;
es.addEventListener("message", (e: MessageEvent) => {
try {
const data = JSON.parse(e.data) as SessionEvent;
for (const handler of this.listeners) {
handler(data);
}
} catch {
// ignore parse errors
}
});
}
disconnect(): void {
if (this.eventSource) {
this.eventSource.close();
this.eventSource = null;
}
}
}
// 全局 SSE bus 实例
export const sseBus = new SSEBus();
// =============================================================================
// RCS Chat Adapter — 将 SSE 事件转为 ThreadEntry
// =============================================================================
function mapToolStatus(status: string): ToolCallStatus {
if (status === "completed") return "complete";
if (status === "failed") return "error";
return "running";
}
function extractEventText(payload: EventPayload): string {
if (typeof payload.content === "string") return payload.content;
if (payload.message && typeof payload.message === "object") {
const msg = payload.message as Record<string, unknown>;
if (typeof msg.content === "string") return msg.content;
if (Array.isArray(msg.content)) {
return (msg.content as Array<Record<string, unknown>>)
.filter((b) => b.type === "text" && typeof b.text === "string")
.map((b) => b.text as string)
.join("");
}
}
return "";
}
function findToolCallIndex(entries: ThreadEntry[], toolCallId: string): number {
for (let i = entries.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
const entry = entries[i];
if (entry && entry.type === "tool_call" && entry.toolCall.id === toolCallId) {
return i;
}
}
return -1;
}
export class RCSChatAdapter {
private sessionId: string;
private setEntries: React.Dispatch<SetStateAction<ThreadEntry[]>>;
private unsub: (() => void) | null = null;
private onStatusChange?: (status: string) => void;
private onError?: (error: string) => void;
private onPermissionRequest?: (permission: PendingPermission) => void;
constructor(
sessionId: string,
setEntries: React.Dispatch<SetStateAction<ThreadEntry[]>>,
options?: {
onStatusChange?: (status: string) => void;
onError?: (error: string) => void;
onPermissionRequest?: (permission: PendingPermission) => void;
},
) {
this.sessionId = sessionId;
this.setEntries = setEntries;
this.onStatusChange = options?.onStatusChange;
this.onError = options?.onError;
this.onPermissionRequest = options?.onPermissionRequest;
}
/** 初始化:绑定会话、加载历史、连接 SSE */
async init(): Promise<void> {
try {
await apiBind(this.sessionId);
} catch {
// may already be bound
}
await this.loadHistory();
this.connectSSE();
}
/** 加载历史事件并转为 ThreadEntry */
async loadHistory(): Promise<void> {
const { events } = await apiFetchSessionHistory(this.sessionId);
if (!events || events.length === 0) return;
const historyEntries: ThreadEntry[] = [];
let currentAssistant: AssistantMessageEntry | null = null;
const flushAssistant = () => {
if (currentAssistant) {
historyEntries.push(currentAssistant);
currentAssistant = null;
}
};
for (const event of events) {
const payload = event.payload || ({} as EventPayload);
if (event.type === "user") {
if (event.direction === "outbound") continue; // skip echoed user messages
flushAssistant();
const text = extractEventText(payload);
if (text) {
historyEntries.push({
type: "user_message",
id: event.id || `hist-user-${historyEntries.length}`,
content: text,
});
}
} else if (event.type === "assistant") {
flushAssistant();
const text = extractEventText(payload);
const toolParts: ThreadEntry[] = [];
const msg = payload.message as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
if (msg && typeof msg === "object" && Array.isArray(msg.content)) {
for (const block of msg.content as Array<Record<string, unknown>>) {
if (block.type === "tool_use") {
toolParts.push({
type: "tool_call",
toolCall: {
id: (block.id as string) || `hist-tool-${historyEntries.length}`,
title: (block.name as string) || "tool",
status: "complete",
rawInput: (block.input as Record<string, unknown>) || {},
},
});
}
}
}
if (text || toolParts.length > 0) {
currentAssistant = {
type: "assistant_message",
id: event.id || `hist-asst-${historyEntries.length}`,
chunks: text ? [{ type: "message", text }] : [],
};
historyEntries.push(currentAssistant);
// Push tool calls after assistant message
for (const tp of toolParts) {
historyEntries.push(tp);
}
currentAssistant = null; // Tool calls are separate entries
}
} else if (event.type === "tool_use") {
const p = payload as Record<string, unknown>;
const tc: ToolCallEntry = {
type: "tool_call",
toolCall: {
id: (p.tool_call_id as string) || `hist-tool-${historyEntries.length}`,
title: (p.tool_name as string) || "tool",
status: "complete",
rawInput: (p.tool_input as Record<string, unknown>) || {},
},
};
historyEntries.push(tc);
} else if (event.type === "tool_result") {
const p = payload as Record<string, unknown>;
// Find last tool call and update with output
const idx = findToolCallIndex(historyEntries, (p.tool_call_id as string) || "");
if (idx >= 0) {
const entry = historyEntries[idx] as ToolCallEntry;
historyEntries[idx] = {
type: "tool_call",
toolCall: {
...entry.toolCall,
rawOutput: { output: p.content || p.output || "" },
},
};
}
}
}
flushAssistant();
this.setEntries(historyEntries);
}
/** 连接 SSE 事件流 */
connectSSE(): void {
sseBus.connect(this.sessionId);
this.unsub = sseBus.onEvent((event) => this.handleEvent(event));
}
/** 断开 SSE */
disconnect(): void {
if (this.unsub) {
this.unsub();
this.unsub = null;
}
sseBus.disconnect();
}
/** 处理 SSE 事件 */
handleEvent(event: SessionEvent): void {
const type = event.type;
const payload = event.payload || ({} as EventPayload);
// Skip bridge init noise
const serialized = JSON.stringify(event);
if (/Remote Control connecting/i.test(serialized)) return;
switch (type) {
// ---- 助手消息 ----
case "assistant": {
const content = typeof payload.content === "string" ? payload.content : "";
this.setEntries((prev) => {
const lastEntry = prev[prev.length - 1];
// If last entry is AssistantMessage, append to it
if (lastEntry?.type === "assistant_message") {
const lastChunk = lastEntry.chunks[lastEntry.chunks.length - 1];
if (lastChunk?.type === "message") {
return [
...prev.slice(0, -1),
{ ...lastEntry, chunks: [...lastEntry.chunks.slice(0, -1), { type: "message", text: lastChunk.text + content }] },
];
}
return [
...prev.slice(0, -1),
{ ...lastEntry, chunks: [...lastEntry.chunks, { type: "message", text: content }] },
];
}
// Create new AssistantMessage
if (content && content.trim()) {
const newEntry: AssistantMessageEntry = {
type: "assistant_message",
id: `assistant-${Date.now()}`,
chunks: [{ type: "message", text: content }],
};
return [...prev, newEntry];
}
return prev;
});
// Check for embedded tool_use blocks
const msg = payload.message as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
if (msg && typeof msg === "object" && Array.isArray(msg.content)) {
const toolBlocks = (msg.content as Array<Record<string, unknown>>).filter((b) => b.type === "tool_use");
for (const block of toolBlocks) {
const toolCallId = (block.id as string) || `call-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2, 8)}`;
const toolData: ToolCallData = {
id: toolCallId,
title: (block.name as string) || "tool",
status: "running",
rawInput: (block.input as Record<string, unknown>) || {},
};
this.setEntries((prev) => [...prev, { type: "tool_call", toolCall: toolData }]);
}
}
break;
}
// ---- 工具调用 ----
case "tool_use": {
const p = payload as Record<string, unknown>;
const toolCallId = (p.tool_call_id as string) || `call-${Date.now()}`;
const toolData: ToolCallData = {
id: toolCallId,
title: (p.tool_name as string) || "tool",
status: "running",
rawInput: (p.tool_input as Record<string, unknown>) || {},
};
this.setEntries((prev) => [...prev, { type: "tool_call", toolCall: toolData }]);
break;
}
// ---- 工具结果 ----
case "tool_result": {
const p = payload as Record<string, unknown>;
const callId = (p.tool_call_id as string) || "";
this.setEntries((prev) => {
const idx = findToolCallIndex(prev, callId);
if (idx < 0) return prev;
const entry = prev[idx] as ToolCallEntry;
return prev.map((e, i) =>
i === idx
? { type: "tool_call", toolCall: { ...entry.toolCall, status: "complete" as ToolCallStatus, rawOutput: { output: p.content || p.output || "" } } }
: e,
);
});
break;
}
// ---- 权限请求 ----
case "control_request":
case "permission_request": {
const req = payload.request as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
if (req && req.subtype === "can_use_tool") {
const requestId = payload.request_id || "";
const toolName = (req.tool_name as string) || "unknown";
const toolInput = (req.input || req.tool_input || {}) as Record<string, unknown>;
const description = (req.description as string) || "";
// Update tool call status
this.setEntries((prev) => {
// Find matching tool call
const idx = [...prev].reverse().findIndex((e) => e.type === "tool_call");
if (idx >= 0) {
const realIdx = prev.length - 1 - idx;
const entry = prev[realIdx] as ToolCallEntry;
if (entry.toolCall.status === "running") {
return prev.map((e, i) =>
i === realIdx
? { type: "tool_call", toolCall: { ...entry.toolCall, status: "waiting_for_confirmation" as ToolCallStatus, permissionRequest: { requestId, options: [] } } }
: e,
);
}
}
return prev;
});
// Notify parent
this.onPermissionRequest?.({
requestId,
toolName,
toolInput,
description,
});
}
break;
}
// ---- 会话状态 ----
case "session_status": {
if (typeof payload.status === "string") {
this.onStatusChange?.(payload.status);
}
break;
}
// ---- 错误 ----
case "error": {
const errorMsg = String(payload.message || payload.content || "Unknown error");
this.onError?.(errorMsg);
break;
}
// ---- 忽略的事件类型 ----
case "partial_assistant":
case "result":
case "result_success":
case "control_response":
case "permission_response":
case "system":
case "task_state":
case "automation_state":
case "status":
break;
}
}
/** 发送用户消息 */
async sendMessage(text: string, images?: UserMessageImage[]): Promise<void> {
if (!text.trim() && (!images || images.length === 0)) return;
// Add user message to entries
const userEntry: UserMessageEntry = {
type: "user_message",
id: `user-${Date.now()}`,
content: text,
images: images && images.length > 0 ? images : undefined,
};
this.setEntries((prev) => [...prev, userEntry]);
// Send to backend
await apiSendEvent(this.sessionId, {
type: "user",
uuid: generateMessageUuid(),
content: text,
message: { content: text },
});
}
/** 响应权限请求 */
async respondPermission(requestId: string, approved: boolean, extra?: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<void> {
await apiSendControl(this.sessionId, {
type: "permission_response",
approved,
request_id: requestId,
...extra,
});
// Update tool call status
this.setEntries((prev) =>
prev.map((entry) => {
if (entry.type !== "tool_call") return entry;
if (entry.toolCall.permissionRequest?.requestId !== requestId) return entry;
return {
type: "tool_call",
toolCall: {
...entry.toolCall,
status: approved ? "running" : ("rejected" as ToolCallStatus),
permissionRequest: undefined,
},
};
}),
);
}
/** 中断当前操作 */
async interrupt(): Promise<void> {
// Mark running tools as canceled
this.setEntries((prev) =>
prev.map((entry) => {
if (entry.type !== "tool_call") return entry;
if (entry.toolCall.status !== "running" && entry.toolCall.status !== "waiting_for_confirmation") return entry;
return {
type: "tool_call",
toolCall: { ...entry.toolCall, status: "canceled" as ToolCallStatus, permissionRequest: undefined },
};
}),
);
await apiInterrupt(this.sessionId);
}
}