Tighten the UDS auth, framing, and response-reader boundaries while keeping the AgentSummary lifecycle covered so Codecov and CI fail on real regressions instead of missing coverage. The poorMode settings mock mirrors unrelated real settings defaults to avoid Bun mock retention changing later permission tests.
Constraint: PR #369 must fix Codecov/CI precisely without warning suppression, fallback masking, or mock pollution
Rejected: Delete AgentSummary lifecycle coverage | would hide Codecov loss and stale-summary behavior
Rejected: Store inline UDS rejection in a hidden input sentinel | cloned observable inputs can drop it and bypass rejection
Rejected: Ignore malformed UDS frames until timeout | leaves client slots and SendMessage calls open to exhaustion
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Keep empty #token= markers rejected; do not require a non-empty token value in hasInlineUdsToken
Tested: bun test packages/builtin-tools/src/tools/SendMessageTool/__tests__/udsRecipientSanitization.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/udsMessaging.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/udsResponseReader.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/ndjsonFramer.test.ts
Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false
Tested: bun run lint
Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter lcov --coverage-dir coverage
Tested: bun run test:all
Tested: bun audit
Tested: bun run build
Tested: bun run build:vite
Not-tested: GitHub-hosted Codecov upload until pushed PR checks rerun
CodeRabbit and Codecov surfaced real gaps in UDS framing, peer discovery, mailbox retention, and summary context coverage. This tightens those paths without suppressing review or coverage signals.
Constraint: PR #369 must address CodeRabbit and Codecov findings without warning suppression or fake fallbacks
Rejected: Suppress Codecov or CodeRabbit warnings | leaves real receive-path and test-isolation gaps
Rejected: Add unreachable feature-gated tests | bun:bundle keeps those branches compile-time gated in local tests
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Keep UDS auth-token rejection outside feature flags; do not reintroduce inline token fallbacks
Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter lcov --coverage-dir coverage; bun run test:all; bun run lint; bun run build; bun run build:vite; bun audit; git diff --cached --check
Not-tested: Remote Codecov/CodeRabbit refreshed reports until pushed
UDS messaging now uses private local capabilities instead of exposing auth tokens through SDK metadata, environment variables, session registry, peer listing, or tool output. The receive path bounds NDJSON frames, response buffers, active clients, and pending inbox bytes, and strips auth metadata before messages enter the prompt queue.
Teammate mailboxes now validate file and message sizes, fail closed on corrupt mutation inputs, compact by count and retained bytes, and use stable message identity for in-process acknowledgements. Agent summaries now fork only a bounded recent context using lazy size estimation and content fingerprints instead of retaining or serializing unbounded histories.
Constraint: PR #361 was already merged; this branch is based on upstream/main@c2ac9a74.
Rejected: Default-disabling COORDINATOR_MODE/TEAMMEM only | explicit feature enablement still hit unbounded paths.
Rejected: Persisting UDS auth in SDK/env/session registry | bridge/remote metadata can leak local capability secrets.
Rejected: Inline uds #token addresses | observable/tool/classifier paths can reflect raw addresses outside the UDS request frame.
Rejected: Positional mailbox marking after compaction | compaction can shift indices across the lock boundary.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Do not expose UDS capability tokens through SDK messages, environment variables, session registry, peer-list output, or SendMessage result/classifier surfaces.
Directive: Do not reintroduce positional mailbox acknowledgements unless compaction is removed or read+mark is atomic under one lock.
Tested: bun test src/utils/__tests__/ndjsonFramer.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/udsMessaging.test.ts packages/builtin-tools/src/tools/SendMessageTool/__tests__/udsRecipientSanitization.test.ts
Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false
Tested: bun run lint
Tested: bunx biome lint modified src/package files
Tested: bun run test:all (3704 pass, 0 fail, 6734 expects)
Tested: bun audit (No vulnerabilities found)
Tested: bun run build
Tested: bun run build:vite
Tested: git diff --check
Not-tested: End-to-end external UDS client driving a full production headless model turn.
* fix: harden ACP communication boundaries
Harden ACP communication boundaries
Remote ACP sessions now cannot widen permission mode through untrusted
metadata or client payloads. WebSocket ACP ingress measures payloads by bytes
before binary decode, and prompt queue handoff keeps exactly one prompt active
while queued prompts are drained FIFO.
Constraint: ACP remote clients must not be able to open bypassPermissions without local launch intent
Constraint: WebSocket payload limits must be byte-based and checked before binary decode
Rejected: Keep promptToQueryContent wrapper | no production consumers remained after prompt conversion single-sourcing
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Do not re-enable remote bypassPermissions from _meta unless a local launch gate is verified in both acp-link and agent
Tested: targeted ACP/RCS/acp-link prompt queue, bridge, permission, payload, and prompt conversion tests; bun run typecheck; bun run build
Not-tested: Manual live ACP/RCS session against an external client
* fix: restore repository verification gates
Keep the full repository test, typecheck, build, and Biome lint gates usable
after the ACP fix pass. This commit is intentionally separate from the ACP
behavior change: it fixes Windows-safe Langfuse home redaction, removes stale
lint suppressions, resolves Biome warning/info diagnostics, and keeps env
expansion tests explicit without template-placeholder lint noise.
Constraint: The project completion contract requires full typecheck, lint, test, and build evidence
Rejected: Leave warning/info diagnostics as historical noise | they obscure future gate regressions and weaken flow-impact claims
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep repository gate cleanup separate from feature fixes when it is not part of the same runtime path
Tested: bunx biome lint src/; bunx tsc --noEmit; bun test src/services/mcp/__tests__/envExpansion.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/sliceAnsi.test.ts src/utils/__tests__/stringUtils.test.ts; bun test; bun run build
Not-tested: Manual Langfuse export against a real external Langfuse service
* fix: harden ACP failure boundaries after review
Deep review found several paths that made ACP communication failures look normal: prompt errors could finish as end_turn, permission pipeline exceptions could fall through to client approval, tool rawInput was deep-copied with JSON, and acp-link accepted unbounded or unvalidated WebSocket payloads. This keeps the behavior fail-closed, validates WS payloads before dispatch, caps payload size before JSON parse, and preserves cancellation intent with a generation counter.
Constraint: User explicitly rejected pseudo-fixes, fallback behavior, and unbounded payload handling
Rejected: Keep JSON stringify/parse rawInput copy | duplicates large payloads and silently drops non-JSON inputs
Rejected: Delegate permission pipeline errors to client approval | allows a broken local permission check to be bypassed
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Do not convert ACP errors into normal end_turn responses without a protocol-level reason and regression tests
Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts
Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts
Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit
Tested: bunx biome lint src/ packages/acp-link/src/
Tested: bun run test:all
Tested: bun run build
Not-tested: Manual end-to-end ACP client session over a real editor WebSocket
* fix: prevent ACP coverage runs from seeing partial mocks
GitHub Actions failed under bun test --coverage because permissions.test.ts replaced ../bridge.js with a partial mock that omitted forwardSessionUpdates. Coverage worker ordering on Linux let sibling tests observe that incomplete module.
This isolates ACP test mocks by snapshotting real exports, overriding only requested symbols, and restoring mocks in LIFO order. The shared helper also keeps the same behavior in agent.test.ts without duplicating mock infrastructure.
Constraint: bun:test mock.module is process-global inside a worker.
Rejected: Add fallback exports or production guards | the bridge export exists; the failure was test mock pollution.
Rejected: Keep per-file helper copies | duplication would let restore semantics drift again.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Prefer safeMockModule for partial mocks of real modules in ACP tests; plain mock.module is only appropriate for fully synthetic modules or isolated tests.
Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts
Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov
Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit
Tested: bun run lint
Tested: git diff --check
Not-tested: Linux runner directly before push
* fix: normalize ACP bypass requests without warning noise
The previous CI repair removed the failing partial bridge mock, but it also added a shared safeMockModule helper and left the acp-link bypass normalization warning in the real new_session path.
This tightens the fix: acp-link now treats an unauthorized client bypass request as normal permission-mode normalization without emitting a warning, and the ACP permission test explicitly preserves the real bridge and permission exports instead of using a shared helper. The agent test keeps its local mock preservation but names it by behavior and restores mocks in LIFO order.
Constraint: CI output should not contain expected warning noise for covered policy branches.
Rejected: Silence the test only | the normal new_session path would still warn for an expected normalization branch.
Rejected: Keep the shared safeMockModule helper | the failing module was specific and should be fixed by preserving real exports at the mocking site.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Treat client-requested bypassPermissions as data to normalize unless the local default explicitly enables bypass.
Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts
Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/bridge.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts
Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov with UPPER_WARN_COUNT=0
Tested: bun run test:all
Tested: bun run lint
Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit
Tested: git diff --check
* fix: harden ACP bypass and CI warning gates
ACP clients must not be able to enter bypassPermissions unless the local ACP gate and process environment both allow it. The same gate now controls session creation, explicit mode changes, and the ExitPlanMode option list, while session setup restores process.cwd so coverage and later work do not inherit ACP session state.
Constraint: CI must stay warning-clean without hiding real ACP permission failures
Rejected: Logging rejected bypass requests on the normal new_session path | it preserves audit text but reintroduces warning noise the runtime should not emit
Rejected: Broad CI=true postinstall skip | it hides explicit Chrome MCP setup checks outside the install path
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Keep bypassPermissions gated through one ACP availability decision before exposing it to clients
Tested: bun test src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts
Tested: bun run test:all
Tested: bun run lint
Tested: bun run build:vite with zero warning matches
Tested: bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter lcov --coverage-dir coverage produced non-empty lcov with SF records and zero filtered warning matches
Not-tested: GitHub Actions result after this push
* fix: remove remaining CI warning noise
The CI log still had three non-failing warnings after the ACP hardening commit: git init default-branch advice from checkout, a Node 20 action-runtime deprecation, and one additional known Vite dynamic-import diagnostic that only surfaced on Linux. The workflow now provides explicit git config and opts actions into Node 24, while Vite keeps a narrow allowlist for acknowledged optimizer diagnostics.
Constraint: Do not use shell log filtering to hide warnings after they happen
Rejected: Grep warning lines out of CI output | it would make future diagnostics harder to find
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Add new Vite warning allowlist entries only after checking that they are existing optimizer diagnostics, not new application defects
Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false
Tested: bunx biome lint .github/workflows/ci.yml vite.config.ts
Tested: bun run build:vite with zero warning matches
Not-tested: GitHub Actions result after this push
* fix: reject unauthorized ACP bypass and harden CI actions
ACP clients now fail closed when permissionMode is malformed, unknown, or requests bypass without a local bypass opt-in. acp-link validates new_session input before forwarding to the agent and returns client error frames for expected unauthorized requests without logging create-failed noise. The direct AcpAgent path independently rejects invalid _meta.permissionMode and unauthorized bypass instead of falling back to settings.
CI workflows and generated GitHub App templates now use Node 24-compatible actions pinned to immutable commit SHAs, and acp-link startup output no longer prints the auth token.
Constraint: Must not hide warnings with test isolation or log filtering
Rejected: Silent fallback to local permission mode | accepts invalid client intent and masks boundary behavior
Rejected: Broad dependency churn from bun update | audit remained failing while package and lockfile churn expanded scope
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Client-provided permissionMode must stay fail-closed before reaching AcpAgent; only local settings.defaultMode may fall back to default on invalid local config
Tested: bun test packages/acp-link/src/__tests__/server.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/agent.test.ts src/services/acp/__tests__/permissions.test.ts src/services/skillLearning/__tests__/skillLifecycle.test.ts src/utils/settings/__tests__/config.test.ts
Tested: bunx tsc -p packages/acp-link/tsconfig.json --noEmit --pretty false
Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false
Tested: bun run lint
Tested: bun run test:all
Tested: local CI equivalent install/typecheck/coverage/build with warning_scan=0
Not-tested: Pre-existing bun audit vulnerabilities require a separate dependency-hardening PR
* fix: resolve dependency audit findings precisely
Use dependency-native upgrades and lockfile resolution to close the audit findings without suppressions. Keep the chrome MCP setup aligned with the new dependency graph and add real integration coverage so the override behavior stays verified.
Constraint: no audit ignores or warning suppression
Rejected: broad google-auth/protobuf overrides | replaced with upstream-compatible resolution
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: keep dependency fixes upstream-compatible; do not reintroduce blanket overrides unless the audit surface changes materially
Tested: bun audit; bun audit --json; bun install --frozen-lockfile with CLAUDE_CODE_SKIP_CHROME_MCP_SETUP=1; bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false; bun run lint; targeted tests; bun run test:all; bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter lcov --coverage-dir coverage; bun run build:vite
Not-tested: unrelated pre-existing ACP/CORS/token fallback residual risks
* fix: keep ACP auth tokens out of URLs
Replace the ad hoc URL-token flow with crypto UUID-backed transport identifiers so the bearer token stays in structured request data instead of query strings. Keep the server, web client, and transport helpers aligned so the ACP/RCS handshake remains compatible after the API shape change.
Constraint: token must not be embedded in the URL
Rejected: token-as-uuid query fallback | leaked bearer tokens in URLs
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: preserve the structured auth path; do not reintroduce query-token fallback when adjusting ACP transport code
Tested: targeted ACP/RCS transport tests
Not-tested: unrelated pre-existing ACP/CORS/token fallback residual risks
* fix: normalize WebFetch request headers
Normalize WebFetch headers before dispatch so canonicalization preserves auth semantics and duplicate forms do not slip through. Keep the behavior locked with a focused header test instead of broadening the request pipeline.
Constraint: preserve header semantics without widening the fetch surface
Rejected: ad hoc caller-side normalization | too easy to bypass in future call sites
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: keep header normalization close to the WebFetch utility so future callers inherit the same behavior automatically
Tested: targeted WebFetch header tests
Not-tested: unrelated fetch backend behavior beyond header normalization
* fix: harden ACP remote auth surfaces
Tighten the remaining Claude security artifact items by requiring API keys on ACP global reads and relay upgrades, moving WebSocket tokens out of URLs, and replacing open web CORS with an explicit allowlist.
Constraint: Browser WebSocket clients cannot set arbitrary Authorization headers, so the token is carried in a selected subprotocol instead of a query string.
Rejected: Keep UUID auth for ACP channel groups | any caller can mint a UUID and read global ACP data.
Rejected: Preserve ?token= compatibility | secrets leak into logs, history, referrers, and intermediaries.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: moderate
Directive: Do not reintroduce query-string bearer tokens; use Authorization or rcs.auth.<base64url-token>.
Tested: bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false
Tested: bun run typecheck in packages/remote-control-server
Tested: bun run build in packages/acp-link
Tested: bun run lint
Tested: bun audit
Tested: focused RCS/acp-link/web tests, 160 pass
Tested: Edge headless browser WebSocket subprotocol handshake
Tested: bun run test:all, 3669 pass
Tested: bun run build:vite
Tested: bun run build
Not-tested: Manual end-to-end relay with a live external ACP agent
* fix: resolve CI dependency override lookup
The CI runner does not expose @grpc/proto-loader as a root-resolvable package, and the test was relying on local hoisting rather than the real dependency owner. Resolve proto-loader through @opentelemetry/exporter-trace-otlp-grpc and @grpc/grpc-js so the smoke test follows the package graph it is validating.
Constraint: Do not add a new root dependency for a transitive smoke test.
Rejected: Skip or weaken the test | the test protects the protobuf 7 override path and should keep exercising loadSync.
Rejected: Add @grpc/proto-loader directly to root package.json | that hides the owning-package resolution issue and broadens dependency surface.
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Dependency override smoke tests should resolve from the package that actually owns the dependency, not from incidental root hoisting.
Tested: bun test tests/integration/dependency-overrides.test.ts; bunx tsc --noEmit --pretty false; bun run lint; bun audit; bun run test:all; git diff --check
---------
Co-authored-by: unraid <local@unraid.local>
loadedGetLanguage 返回类型中 name 字段改为可选，匹配 highlight.js
Language 类型中 name 为 string | undefined 的定义。
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
